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The global financial crisis made clear that the financial sector and financial frictions play 
an integral role in the macroeconomy. Modelers are quickly incorporating these in different 
ways. This dissertation research also investigates both the causes and effects of financial crises. 
The first essay, which is mostly empirical, analyzes the impact of the recent U.S. financial crisis 
on Mexico while the second one, which is theoretical, introduces the Minsky financial friction 
into the literature as one of the causes of banking and financial crises.  
In the first essay, we simulate the impact of the U.S. financial crisis on Mexico, a major 
trading partner with close financial linkages, with the Gali and Monacelli (2005) small open 
economy DSGE model under two exchange rate regimes: the actual floating and the 
counterfactual fixed exchange rate regime. We assume the financial crisis generates a supply side 
shock (a productivity shock) and a demand side shock (a preference shock), which are the 
driving forces of the model. The results indicate that for both the demand and supply side shocks, 
the floating exchange rate ameliorates much of the impact on the Mexican economy vis-à-vis the 
counterfactual fixed exchange rate regime. Then I consider interest rate adjustments initiated in 
response by both the U.S. and Mexican monetary authorities.  For the fixed exchange rate regime 
the impulse responses due to the productivity shock on most of Mexico’s macroeconomic 
variables dissipate in less than thirteen quarters, with inflationary effects on price variables and 
permanent effects on the CPI and Mexico’s home goods prices. Under the flexible exchange rate 
regime the effects of this shock are much smaller, and there is a deflationary effect and negative 
permanent effects on the nominal exchange rate, the CPI and Mexico’s home goods prices. The 
variance decompositions indicate that the effects on real variables are larger under the fixed 
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exchange rate regime and the external linkages are tighter. Welfare analysis shows that losses 
under the float are also less vis-a-vis the fixed and two other alternative central bank policy rules. 
The second essay introduces a new mechanism for financial frictions in a monetary 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model following Minsky’s financial instability 
hypothesis (1977). We expand the Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2011) model by 
introducing three different types of entrepreneurs or borrowers: hedge, speculative and Ponzi 
borrowers. We change the role of banks from a non-risk taking financial intermediary in the 
CTW (2011) model to a risky debt accumulator. Then we link the accumulation of debt to the 
endogenous state of nature, which is absent in the current DSGE literature. The state of nature is 
endogenously a function of past history and the relative state of the business cycle. So ultimately 
the bank’s profit function is a function of business cycle fluctuations. We also introduce a new 
type of shock, which we call the “Minsky system risk” shock. This shock captures excessive 
system risk that occurs within a banking network due to intermediation and interconnection 
among banks. Then we calculate the likelihood of a Minsky moment (or financial crisis) 
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The following two essays focus on different aspects of financial crises. After the recent 
financial crisis of 2007-2009, which started in the U.S. subprime mortgage market, economists 
started to revise their models to answer the new questions of the post crisis era. Some of these 
questions are: Why did the financial crises happen? How can we forecast the occurrence of 
financial crises? What is the probability of this occurrence? And what might be the effects of 
financial crises on both domestic and global economies? To answer these questions, economists 
use different types of models, but one of the most popular ones widely used by central banks and 
monetary authorities is the dynamic stochastic equilibrium (DSGE) model. In this dissertation 
we modify and expand current DSGE models in a way that allows us to answer some of the 
important questions of financial crises. 
In the first essay, we modify the Gali and Monacelli (2005) small open economy DSGE 
model, to see the effect of the recent financial crisis of the U.S. on Mexico, a major trading 
partner with close financial linkages, under two exchange rate regimes: the actual floating regime 
and a counter factual fixed exchange rate regime. We simulate the impact of the U.S. financial 
crisis on both the U.S. and Mexico by calibrating a DSGE based on available data for these 
economies to see how this intensive shock would propagate through these economies with the 
focus on Mexico’s economy. We then consider interest rate adjustments initiated in response by 
both the U.S. and Mexico’s monetary authorities to see if the choice of monetary policy regimes 
limit or exacerbate the impact of the financial crisis.  We found a permanent positive effect on 
the CPI, the effective nominal exchange rate and Mexico’s home prices. Welfare losses were 
greater under the fixed exchange rate because the return path to equilibrium was more volatile, 
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with overshooting, for output, consumption and employment. Monetary policy, inflation 
targeting with a floating exchange rate, clearly reduced the welfare costs of financial crisis vis-à-
vis other policies examined. 
In the second paper, we focus on developing a new type of financial friction on DSGE 
models which allows the calculation of the probability of occurrence of a banking and financial 
crisis. To do this we mathematize the notion of financial instability. We expand the Christiano, 
Trabandt and Walentin (2011) DSGE model by introducing three different types of entrepreneurs 
or borrowers: hedge, speculative and Ponzi borrowers. We change the role of banks from a non-
risk taking financial intermediary in the CTW (2011) model to a risky debt accumulator. Then 
we link the accumulation of debt to the endogenous state of nature, which is absent in the current 
DSGE literature. The state of nature is endogenously a function of past history and the relative 
state of the business cycle. So ultimately the bank’s profit function is a function of business cycle 
fluctuations. We also introduce a new type of shock, which we call the “Minsky system risk” 
shock and calculate the likelihood of a Minsky moment endogenously based on bank’s profit 






Exchange Rate Regimes and Welfare Losses from Foreign Crises: The Impact of the US 
Financial Crisis on Mexico 
Introduction 
    The recent financial crisis and its rapid propagation to other economies clearly 
revealed the interdependencies that exist among the world’s economies. What began as a crisis in 
the U.S. subprime mortgage market spread quickly over global financial markets and 
underscored the policy dependencies as well. Determination of these linkages and the 
mechanism of propagation of foreign shocks are critical in designing effective policies to 
minimize the effects on the domestic economy. An economy with high likelihood of major 
negative consequences from the 2008-2009 U.S. financial crisis was Mexico. In the last two 
decades, Mexico has implemented trade and financial liberalization, including entering NAFTA 
in 1994. While increased integration with the global economy is likely to allow faster trend 
growth in Mexico, integration also makes the economy more sensitive to external shocks and 
spillover effects from its major trading partners. As a result inflation targeting was introduced in 
2001 to improve policy effectiveness and transparency in the face of structural changes.1  In this 
paper we model the US-Mexico linkages under alternative exchange rate regimes and illustrate 
how the floating exchange rate regime ameliorated the potential negative consequences. Then we 
examine the effects of monetary policy responses by the Mexican Central Bank. We begin with 
Gali’s (2008) New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) small open 
economy model in a multi-country, multi-good (variety) framework. We simulate the effect of 
both foreign and monetary policy shocks separately in a fixed exchange rate and a floating 
                                                          
1 In 1994 the central bank of Mexico introduced a float and since 1996 the central bank of Mexico began 
to set annual inflation targets, and inflation targeting was officially announced in 2001 (Bank de Mexico).    
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exchange rate regime.  We find an approximate solution via a Taylor expansion of the policy 
function describing the dynamics of the variables of the model around the deterministic steady 
state (Villaverde, 2010).    
     Section 2 provides background on Mexico and illustrates the linkages between the Mexican 
and U.S. economies. Section 3 outlines the basic issues via a selected review of the literature and 
describes the model. Section 4 presents calibration of the model and the simulation results and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 Background  
 Mexico began liberalization of its financial markets in 1994, after the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed. Opening and liberalization effectively linked the 
Mexican economy with the global economy in general, and the U.S. economy in particular. 
Moreover, in 1996 the central bank began the transition to inflation targeting, formally 
announced in 2001.  Following the recovery from the peso crisis in 1994, real GDP increased an 
average 3.7 percent per year during 1996-2007 and real GDP per worker grew by 1.7 percent per 
year. More recently, as a result of the US financial crisis the Mexican economy also slowed 
during 2007-2009, as real GDP growth and real GDP per worker declined -0.5 and -1.7 percent 
per year. Economic growth resumed in 2010, as the growth rates of real GDP and GDP per 
worker returned to 5.3 and 3.9 percent per year respectively. 
 Mexico is the third largest U.S. trading partner after Canada and China with 13.3% of 
total U.S. trade turnover2. On the other hand, the U.S. is Mexico’s largest trading partner and 
largest foreign investor, buying more than 80% of Mexican exports and investing more than 
$91.4 billion in FDI in Mexico (Villarreal, 2012). The interdependencies between the two 
                                                          
2 (Exports+Imports), Data from U.S. Department of Commerce, 2012  
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countries are recognizable in the basic macro aggregates. Figure 1 shows the real business cycles 
for each of these countries for 1995-20143. Note that the correlation is strong during this period. 
    Since we are interested in the impact of the 2008-2009 crisis, let’s focus on a narrower period 
of 2005-2013 in Figures 2 and 3. They illustrate almost the same patterns between U.S. and 
Mexico real GDPs, and the high interdependency between the two economies. After the 2008 
shock, both economies’ growth resumes in the second quarter of 2009. U.S. real GDP returns to 
its trend by the last quarter of 2010, but then falls below the trend until the last quarter of 2011. 
Mexico’s real GDP returns to its trend in the second quarter of 2011, two quarters faster than the 
U.S.  The recovery in Mexico in 2010 was mostly due to an increase in external demand, which 
increased manufacturing exports, rather than from internal demand, so its sustainability is 
contingent on continued US growth (Villarreal, 2010).  
 
Figure 1: U.S. and Mexico Real GDP (1995-2014 period). 
                                                          




Figure 2: U.S. Real GDP Quarterly4 (2005-2013 period). 
 
 
Figure 3: Mexico Real GDP Quarterly5 (2005-2013 period). 
 
                                                          
4 GDP Quarterly (constant 2010 US$, Seasonally adjusted), Data from Federal Reserve Economic Data, 
FRED, St. Louis Federal Reserve  (Source: OECD, 2014) 
 
5 GDP Quarterly (constant 2010 US$, Seasonally adjusted), Data from Federal Reserve Economic Data, 
FRED, St. Louis Federal Reserve (Source: OECD, 2014) 
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Table 1 shows the correlation of consumption, domestic investment and GDP of Mexico 
and the US. For the 1995-2014 period correlations of the Hodrick-Prescott detrended real GDP is 
0.79. First, the low correlation of 0.53 between U.S. consumption and Mexico’s output suggests 
that consumption in U.S. is less related to Mexico’s output. Most important is the high 
correlation of 0.78 between U.S. investment and Mexico’s output. As a result of increases in 
trade and financial relationships between the two countries after 1995, the business cycles of the 
two countries have become highly correlated and there is a strong co-movement between major 
macroeconomic variables of the two economies.  
 
Table 1: Correlation of US and Mexican Macroeconomic Aggregates, 1995-2014 period. 
 Hodrick_Prescott Filter detrended  
 U.S Consumption U.S Investment US. Output 
Mexico Consumption 0.68 0.63 0.72 
Mexico Investment 0.58 0.64 0.73 
Mexico Output 0.53 0.78 0.79 
 
Figure 4 shows the Mexican interest rate and the Mexico-U.S. interest rate spread for 
Mexico after 1998. After 2008 the US interest rate is at the zero lower bound and the spread is 
simply the Mexican interest rate. The sharp decrease in both the Mexican interest rate and the 
Mexico-U.S. spread between 2008 and 2009 clearly indicates the Mexican monetary authority’s 
response to the foreign shock caused by the U.S. financial crisis. Later we consider this policy 









Figure 4: Mexico Interest Rate and Mexico-U.S. Spread (Government Funding Rate, Daily6 
1998-2013 period).  
 
    Figures 5 and 6 focus on the period 2005 to 2013 and show more clearly the sharp decline in 
interest rates in both countries after the crisis. This is the result of both countries’ monetary 
policies, strong interest rate reductions.    
    In Figure 7, we see the financial crisis generated a sharp increase in Mexico’s nominal 
exchange rate. It appears that after this depreciation of the Peso, the exchange rate finds a new 
level, around 13, and never returns to pre-crisis rates.  Our IRF results capture  this response 
under the demand side shock simulation. Figure 7 also shows the movements of CPI 
differentials, interest rate differentials and Mexico’s Peso/Dollar exchange rate. All first rise 
sharply and then decline fast during 2008-2010. Interest rate differentials and the exchange rate 
follow almost the same pattern. After the shock, they reach new normals with almost no unusual 
movements.   
                                                          
6 Representative interest rate on one day repo operations on government securities traded by banks and 
stockbrokerage firms in the wholesale market settled through the delivery versus payment system in 
INDEVAL (securities clearing house). Securities prices and interest rates Tables (Bank de Mexico, 2013). 
Spread is defined as the difference between Mexico and U.S. interest rate. U.S. interest rate is Feds Funds 




















Figure 5: Mexico Interest Rate (Government Funding Rate, Daily7 2005-2013 period). 
 
 
Figure 6: U.S. Interest Rate (Fed Funds Rate, Daily8 2005-2013 period). 
  
                                                          
7 Representative interest rate on one day repo operations on government securities traded by banks and 
stockbrokerage firms in the wholesale market settled through the delivery versus payment system in 
INDEVAL (securities clearing house). Securities prices and interest rates Tables (Bank de Mexico, 2013). 
It appears that interest rate seems stable but it is not pegged.  
 








































































































































































































































































Figure 7: CPI, Interest Rate Differentials and Exchange Rate9 
 
The Mexico-U.S. Model 
    To perform the analysis, there is little to guide our work regarding the effects of foreign 
shocks on Mexico. Sosa (2008) examines the relative importance of external shocks, i.e., from 
the U.S., as a source of business cycle fluctuations in Mexico, using a SVAR model with block 
exogeneity (structural) restrictions, and finds that U.S shocks explain a large share of Mexico’s 
macroeconomic fluctuations after NAFTA. Tovar (2006), employs a Real Business Cycle DSGE 
model to analyze the effects of currency devaluations on output in Chile, Colombia and Mexico, 
but, it is not a multi-country model. They assess the relative importance of two main 
transmission channels: expenditure-switching and balance sheet effects. Estimation is via 
maximum likelihood and the results indicate that on average during the last two decades explicit 
devaluation policy shocks have been expansionary.  
                                                          
9 Interest rate differential = Mexico’s treasury bill rate – U.S. treasury bill rate, CPI Differential = CPI % 










































































































































 Comin, et al. (2014) models the effects of real shocks from the U.S. on Mexico’s GDP 
with a two country asymmetric DSGE model.  In their model there is endogenous and slow 
diffusion of technologies from the US to Mexico and there are adjustment costs of investment 
flows.  They focus mainly on FDI flows, because it permits the transfer of production of some 
goods to Mexico that are then exported to the U.S. As a result, bilateral trade arises 
endogenously. They calibrate the model to match the annual bilateral trade and FDI flows of 
Mexico and the U.S for the period of 1990-2008. 
     From their model, there is a large initial response of Mexico’s investment to U.S shocks and 
U.S. short-term fluctuations precede fluctuations in both Mexico’s GDP and embodied 
productivity. This is due to the international diffusion of technologies in Mexico’s output 
dynamics. When a shock affects the return to exporting new technologies to Mexico, it induces 
very wide fluctuations in the flow of new technologies exported to Mexico. In the U.S., in 
contrast, there is no such large stock of technologies waiting to be adopted. They conclude that 
U.S. and Mexican output co-move, U.S. shocks have a larger effect on Mexico than vice versa 
and Mexican consumption is more volatile than output. This suggests that investment does not 
have a major role in consumption smoothing in Mexico. So, models without capital may capture 
business cycle fluctuations. While this paper is an important contribution, financial 
interdependencies are not included in the model and government, central bank, credit channels 
and other financial dependencies between the two countries are absent.  
 In a recent study, Hernandez and Leblebicioglu (2013) estimate a two-country real 
business cycle model with data prior to the recent financial crisis to estimate the extent of 
transmission of U.S. shocks to Mexico. The model consists of households, firms and 
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government. They find that domestic productivity shocks explain 43% of the volatility in 
Mexico’s GDP growth, while different U.S. shocks explain 31% of volatility. 
Edwards and Yeyati (2005) analyze the effect of terms of trade shocks on economic 
performance under alternative exchange rate regimes for 183 countries over the period 1974–
2000. They find evidence suggesting that terms of trade shocks get amplified in countries that 
have more rigid exchange rate regimes and countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes 
grow faster than countries with fixed exchange rates. 
Now we would like to model the effects of the US shocks under different exchange rate 
regimes and consider the role of monetary policy responses. Since we are focusing on the 
immediate or short-run policy responses to the US crisis, we employ a short-run model with 
sticky prices and no investment or capital accumulation10.  Therefore, we begin with the small 
open economy of Gali and Monacelli (2005), and expanded in Gali (2008). The model provides a 
multi-country framework in which the world is divided into two regions: Mexico and the United 
States.11 Each economy consists of households, firms and a monetary authority and both 
economies have identical preferences, technology, and market structure in terms of the functional 
form, but with different calibration of the parameters. Since it is designed for short run policy 
analysis there is no capital in the model to capture real financial shocks, like an investment 
specific shock.  Thus, we assume a negative productivity (supply side) shock and a negative 
preference (demand side) shock in the U.S. as the sources of fluctuations, which then propagate 
                                                          
10 As showed in Comin, et al. (2014) unlike Europe, investment does not have a major role in 
consumption smoothing in Mexico. Kiyotaki (2011) also discusses that short-term changes in investment 
have little impact on capital stock. That is because if there is a persistent increase of output, permanent 
income and consumption will increase almost as much as current income, which leaves little room for 
investment to rise. Therefore, we conclude that capital plays a limited role in the propagation of shocks. 
  
11 Note that the model is solved in a multi-country framework in this section, but in the next section for 
calibration we assume the effects of other countries are negligible, The U.S. then is taken as the world 
economy and Mexico is a small open economy. 
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to Mexico. Mexico’s production and preference functions are imperfectly correlated with the 
U.S. productivity and preference shocks. We simulate the model and examine impulse responses 
when the exchange rate is fixed and when it is allowed to float.  
 We then illustrate the effect of a monetary policy response by Mexico’s monetary 
authority to the U.S. shock under both regimes.12 Their action is modeled as an exogenous shock 
to the Mexico interest rate. For each shock we compare the magnitudes of the responses in each 
exchange rate regime and find that the negative effects of the US shocks are much smaller in the 
floating exchange rate regime case. Each sector of the economy in the Gali model is very briefly 
described in Appendix A.13 Here we only summarize the canonical representation of the model. 
Note that our model is slightly different from Gali’s original model. We add a preference shock 
and re-solve the model.  
Dynamic Equilibrium 
    The linearized equilibrium dynamics for the small open economy may be written in terms of 
the output gap and domestic inflation (home produced goods inflation). Let ?̃?𝑡 ≡ 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡
𝑛 denote 
the domestic output gap where 𝑦𝑡
𝑛 is the natural level of output. Domestic real marginal cost and 
the output gap are related according to 𝑚?̂?𝑡 = (𝜎𝛼 + 𝜑)?̃?𝑡 
    Combining this expression with (18A) in Appendix A, the New Keynesian Phillips (NKP) 
curve for the open economy may be written as 
𝜋𝐻,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡{𝜋𝐻,𝑡+1} + 𝑘𝛼?̃?𝑡                                                     (1) 
where 𝑘𝛼 ≡ 𝜆(𝜎𝛼 + 𝜑). 
                                                          
12 We also consider the U.S. monetary policy response but since our focus is on Mexico we report the 
results in Appendix G. 
 
13  For detailed description of the model, including the aggregation of the j varieties into a composite 
consumption good, calculation of the price indices and uncovered interest parity see Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 
7 of Gali (2008). 
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    Using (25A) in Appendix A, the dynamic IS (DIS) equation for the open economy in terms of 
the output gap may be written as: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡{?̃?𝑡+1} −
1
𝜎𝛼
(𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡{𝜋𝐻,𝑡+1} − 𝑟𝑡
𝑛)                         (2) 
where 
𝑟𝑡









+ 𝜎𝛼 ( Γð −
𝛼Θ(1 − α) 
𝜎
)𝐸𝑡{Δð𝑡+1}




i }                                       (3) 
is the small open economy’s natural rate of interest. All parameters are as defined in  Appendices 
A and C.  
Monetary Authority 
    It is assumed the monetary authority follows an interest rate rule14:  
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌 + 𝜙𝜋𝜋𝐻,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑦?̃?𝑡 + 𝔜𝑡                                           (4) 
where 𝔜𝑡 is an exogenous component, 𝜙𝜋 and 𝜙𝑦 are parameters chosen by the monetary 
authority and are ≥ 0.15  All other variables are as previously defined. For the fixed exchange 
rate regime this policy is replaced with 𝑒𝑡 = 0.  
                                                          
14 Also as a practical matter headline CPI is typically the measure of inflation in the rule, but it may be 
core CPI, trimmed CPI, home prices, etc.  
 
15 The zero lower bound problem (ZLB) is addressed by the calibration of the model in the next section. 
Also as discussed in Swanson and Williams (2014): “1- and 2-year yields remained substantially above 
zero throughout much of 2008–10 suggesting that monetary policy still had room to affect the economy 
despite the constraint on the current level of the federal funds rate”. They argue that “the economy is 
affected by the entire path of expected future short-term interest rates, not just the current level of the 




Taylor (2000) argues simple rules, in which the interest rate reacts to inflation and real 
output, are robust to many different views about how monetary policy works. Gains from more 
complicated rules over simple rules that react only to smoothed inflation and output are small. 
Nonetheless we also considered other rules, including, for example, adding the Mexico-US 
interest rate spread to the policy rule, e.g.,  𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌 + 𝜙𝜋𝜋𝐻,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑦?̃?𝑡 + 𝜙𝑠𝑆𝑡 + 𝔜𝑡 , where 𝑆𝑡 is 
the Mexico-U.S. spread. IRFs are comparable.   Therefore, herein we adopt and report the results 
for a simple rule, which Gali (2008, chapter 4) shows is optimal under certain conditions, and 
which also mimics that of the Bank de Mexico.    
Driving Forces 
    To consider the effects of monetary policy shocks, it is assumed the exogenous component of 
the interest rate 𝔜𝑡 follows an AR (1) process in both economies: 
𝔜𝑡 = 𝜌𝔜𝔜𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝔜
 
where  𝜌𝔜  ∈ [0,1) and 𝜀𝑡
𝔜
 is a zero mean white noise process. 
    In order to determine the economy’s response to technology shocks from US on Mexico, we 






where 𝜌𝑎∗  ∈ [0,1) and 𝜀𝑡
𝑎∗ is a zero mean white noise process. 






ð𝑡 = 𝜌ðð𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(ð𝑡
∗, ð𝑡)𝜀𝑡
ð∗   
 where 𝜌ð∗  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜌ð  ∈ [0,1) and 𝜀𝑡
ð∗  and 𝜀𝑡
ð  are zero mean white noise processes. 
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The full set of equations that define the model are listed in appendices A and B. 
Welfare 
As it is shown in Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Gali (2008), the expected period welfare 
losses of any policy that deviates from the optimal inflation targeting16 can be written in terms of 







 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜋𝐻,𝑡) + (1 + 𝜑) 𝑣𝑎𝑟( ?̃?𝑡)]                                 (5) 
This is expressed in terms of the equivalent permanent consumption decline, measured as a 
fraction of steady state consumption. 
Calibration and Simulation 
In this section we present the calibration followed by simulation results.  We illustrate the 
equilibrium behavior of different macroeconomic variables for Mexico.   
Calibration 
The benchmark parameterization is a generally accepted parameterization with values 
assumed or estimated in the literature and as found in Gali (2008) with some necessary changes 
for our analysis. Obviously there are alternatives and we considered many17.  We examine 
theoretical moments that best match the actual moments. It is assumed that  𝜑 = 3 for the U.S., 
(Frisch elasticity of labor supply) which implies a labor supply elasticity of  
1
3
 . For Mexico 𝜑 =
                                                          
16 Under monopolistic competition and sticky prices once an appropriately chosen subsidy that exactly 
offsets the market power distortion is in place, the optimal policy is called a “simple rule” which fully 
stabilizes the price level.  (See Gali 2008, Ch 4 for conditions of optimal policy).  
 
17 We calibrated the model with many of these alternatives including other possible parameters and also 
other possible monetary rules like domestic inflation-based Taylor rule (DITR), CPI inflation-based 
Taylor rule (CITR) and also the special case of Gali (2008), 𝜎 =  𝜂 = 𝛾 and then accepted the best 
calibration, based on the actual moments to report here (See Table J.1 and J.2). We also estimated the 




0.5. We set 𝜎 = 0.2 in Mexico, which corresponds to a log utility specification.  For the U.S. we 
set 𝜎 to 0.6.  Other parameters are set in accord with the literature, which are also reasonable for 
Mexico.   𝜂 = 1 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, and 𝛾 = 2.5 
is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in different foreign countries. We 
assume the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods (of the same country origin) 
ℶ = 6 implying a steady state mark up of prices over marginal costs of 20%. We set the natural 
index of price stickiness, to  𝜃 = 0.75 in both economies, which is a value consistent with an 
average period of one year between price adjustments.  It is also assumed, based on the results of 
other studies, that in the U.S. 𝛽 = 0.99  which implies a riskless annual return of about 4% in the 
steady state and 𝛽 = 0.95  in Mexico.   𝜌 ≡ − log𝛽 is the time discount rate and 𝜔 = 𝜎𝛾 +
(1 − 𝛼)(𝜎𝜂 − 1).      𝜌ð = 𝜌ð
∗ = 0.7 and 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(ð , ð∗) = 0.3. For the calibration of the interest 
rate rule,  𝜙𝜋  is set to 1.5 and 𝜙𝑦 =
0.5
4⁄  , since we use quarters as the relevant time period. 
These two values are chosen by both central banks.  The degree of openness which corresponds 
to trade turnover/GDP ratio of Mexico is set to 𝛼 = 0.518. 
In order to calibrate the stochastic properties of the U.S. exogenous technology shock, the 
log of labor productivity in US between 1990 and 2010 is used19. To find  𝜌𝑎 for Mexico we do 
the same thing. For each we estimate an AR(1) process with 𝜌𝑎 = 0.19 for Mexico, and with 
𝜌𝑎
∗ = 0.7  for the US. We also find 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑎 , 𝑎∗) = 0.2. In addition, for the calibration of the 
exogenous monetary shock, we fit an AR(1) process for the interest rate to estimate it and find 
𝜌𝔜
∗ = 0.41 for the U.S. and 𝜌𝔜 = 0.65 for Mexico. Then, given these parameters, other 
parameters of the model are calculated endogenously. (See Appendix C) 
                                                          
18 We also calibrated with other values, e.g., the import/GDP ratio, 𝛼 = 0.33 
 
19 Data from OECD Data base (2013) 
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Business Cycle and Welfare Analysis 
Business cycle characteristics are displayed in Table 2, which reports the standard 
deviations as a percent of the steady state of key variables in fixed and floating exchange rate 
regimes. Comparing the moments of the log of Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filtered data over the 
period 1960:Q1-2014:Q4 with the H-P filtered theoretical moments the calibrations capture 
variations in the variables for both U.S and Mexico very well. We observe that under the float 
volatility of Mexican GDP is lower than under the peg. For the interest rate it is exactly opposite, 
floating amplifies the volatility.20  
Table 2: Cyclical properties (Moments) 
Variables Actual  Float Fixed 
Std % Std% %Std %Std 
U.S. GDP 1.5 1.50 1.50 
U.S. Consumption 1.2 1.50 1.50 
U.S. Interest Rate 0.38 0.60 0.60 
U.S. Inflation Rate 0.6 0.60 0.60 
Mexico GDP 2.3 2.31 3.76 
Mexico Consumption 2.7 2.70 3.68 
Mexico Interest Rate 0.26 0.26 0.21 
Mexico Inflation Rate 0.62 0.53 0.60 
 
Table 3 reports the welfare losses in percent of steady state consumption (Recall from 
section 3.4 above). The volatility of both domestic inflation and the output gap are amplified in 
the fixed exchange rate regime. Using equation (5) welfare losses under the fixed exchange rate 
are equal to 12.4319 percent of steady state consumption compared to 7.5284 for floating.21 
Although the calibrations are different, these results are similar to the findings of Gali and 
Monacelli (2005).         
                                                          
20 See Appendix J for other alternative monetary policy regimes that may be considered 
21 Also comparing two other alternative inflation targeting regimes (See Appendix J) the welfare losses 
are still lowest for the float. 
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Var(Output gap) 5.6140 11.4063 
Total 5.9605 11.9273 
Welfare loss 7.5284 12.4319 
 
Variance decomposition 
The variance decompositions make clear the differences in the channels through which 
the external shocks affect the domestic economy under the two exchange rate regimes. These are 
reported in Table 4. Relative to the preference shock and monetary policy shocks, a one standard 
deviation shock to productivity explains a greater part of changes of the U.S. GDP, natural 
output and consumption under both exchange rate regimes. The preference shock, relative to 
other shocks, explains a greater part of the U.S. interest rate, natural interest rate, and of 
Mexico’s natural output, natural interest rate, terms of trade and real exchange rate under both 
exchange rate regimes. Most of the changes of the other variables are explained by monetary 
policy shocks. The fixed exchange rate regime makes the foreign linkages tighter. This is due to 
the fact that there is no opportunity for a reaction or response from Mexico’s monetary authority 
under this regime. We see for example that a productivity shock explains 79.6% of the variance 
in the Mexican interest rate (𝑖𝑡) under the fixed exchange rate regime, but only about 1% under 
the float.  The variance of output is also much more attributable to the preference shock (82%) 
under the fixed vis-à-vis the floating exchange rate regime (27%). This pattern is the same for 
consumption and hours of labor as well, which clearly shows that there are two different 
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channels under the fixed and floating exchange rate regimes, through which U.S. supply and 




Table 4: Variance Decompositions 
 
 






























∗ 57.60 4.58 0 37.56 57.60 4.58 37.56 
𝑖𝑡
∗ 28.58 68.05 0 3.38 28.58 68.05 3.38 
𝑎𝑡
∗ 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 
𝜋𝑡
∗ 12.03 28.66 0 59.31 12.03 28.66 59.31 
?̃?𝑡
∗ 4.58 10.90 0 84.52 4.58 10.90 84.52 
𝑦𝑡
𝑛∗ 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 
𝑟𝑡
𝑛∗ 29.58 70.42 0 0 29.58 70.42 0 
𝑐𝑡
∗ 57.60 4.85 0 37.56 57.60 4.85 37.56 
𝑚?̂?𝑡
∗ 4.58 10.90 0 84.52 4.58 10.90 84.52 
𝑚𝑐𝑡
∗ 4.58 10.90 0 84.52 4.58 10.90 84.52 
𝑎𝑡 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 
𝑦𝑡
𝑛 26.64 67.27 0 6.10 26.64 67.27 6.10 
?̃?𝑡 0.18 4.73 94.72 0.37 0.93 80.70 18.38 
𝑖𝑡 1.39 93.30 2.20 3.11 79.56 7.95 12.49 
𝜋𝐻,𝑡 0.10 6.26 93.49 0.15 5.98 66.55 27.48 
𝑟𝑡
𝑛 7.13 83.80 0 9.07 7.13 83.80 9.07 
𝑚𝑐𝑡 0.19 0.03 99.39 0.39 1.22 74.55 24.23 
𝑦𝑡 3.93 27.26 66.47 2.35 2.96 81.85 15.20 
𝑛𝑡  2.13 27.76 67.71 2.40 1.73 82.88 15.39 
𝑚?̂?𝑡 0.18 4.73 94.72 0.37 0.93 80.70 18.38 
𝑠𝑡 2.42 64.66 31.26 1.66 20.12 59.88 19.99 
𝑞𝑡 2.42 64.66 31.26 1.66 20.12 59.88 19.99 
𝑐𝑡 1.83 4.67 92.49 1.01 2.84 77.17 43.48 
𝜋𝑡  1.11 30.43 66.97 1.50 8.50 48.02 4.39 
𝑛𝑥𝑡  5.65 17.52 72.96 3.87 4.42 91.19 0 






Impulse responses trace the impact of various shocks to the time path of each variable of 
the model (which are all in logarithms). As described earlier, we wish to examine the effects of 
three distinct shocks (technology, preference and monetary policy shock) on each endogenous 
variable of the model under two different exchange rate regimes (fixed and floating).  
The Response to a U.S. Supply Side Shock 
First, we start by a brief comparison of the impulse responses of the U.S. technology 
shock to GDP on the supply side and a US preference shock on the demand side of the 
economy22 under each exchange rate regime and then we consider the impulse responses for the 
Central Bank de Mexico’s monetary policy response (shock) as mentioned in section 2, figure 
5.23 The blue line in Figure 8 displays the impulse responses of the technology shock under the 
floating exchange rate. (The green line is for the fixed exchange rate regime and the red line is 
the difference in the respective IRFs, or the “buffer”; each discussed further below). Table 5 also 
compares the IRFs for selected variables under both floating and fixed exchange rate regimes 












                                                          
22 Both US technology and preference shocks immediately propagate to Mexico, since Mexico’s 
technology and preference functions are imperfectly correlated with the U.S. This is not the case for the 
US monetary policy shock.  
   





Table 5: Responses to Productivity Shock (𝜀𝑎𝑡∗) 














𝑎𝑡 -0.2 Negative 3Q -0.2 Negative 3Q 
?̃?𝑡 0.1 Positive/Negative 10Q -0.1 Negative/Positive 15Q 
𝑦𝑡 -0.4 Negative 13Q -0.6 Negative/Positive 15Q 
𝑐𝑡 -0.4 Negative 13Q -0.6 Negative/Positive 15Q 
𝑛𝑥𝑡  -0.2 Negative 10Q -0.1 Negative 13Q 
𝑛𝑡  -0.2 Negative 13Q -0.5 Negative/Positive 13Q 
𝑠𝑡 0.2 Positive 13Q 0.1 Positive 15Q 
𝑞𝑡 0.1 Positive 13Q 0.05 Positive 15Q 
𝜋𝐻,𝑡 0 Negative 10Q 0.06 Positive 15Q 
𝜋𝑡  0.1 Positive/Negative 13Q 0.1 Positive 13Q 
𝑖𝑡 0 Negative 13Q 0.15 Positive 13Q 


























We consider a one standard deviation negative U.S. technology shock.  Under the 
floating exchange regime, as the impulse response functions illustrate, the negative effects of this 
shock on U.S productivity and output vanish in 13 quarters.  This is also the case with Mexico’s 
output. This shock affects 18 endogenous macroeconomic variables in Mexico, but the effects 
are temporary on all except the effective nominal exchange rate, the CPI level and Mexico home 
prices. The corresponding IRF of the nominal exchange rate starts from zero, then turns negative 
and remains so. The corresponding IRFs of Mexico home prices and CPI level are very small but 
persistent. 
The IRFs for a fixed exchange rate are the green line in Figure 8. Under a fixed exchange 
rate, there is no permanent effect on any variable except for Mexico home prices and CPI level. 
They are initially zero and then turn positive and remain so. Comparing the IRFs for the fixed 
exchange rate (green line in Figure 8) and the floating rate (blue line), we see the effect of shocks 
on the output, consumption, domestic inflation, domestic prices, CPI level, interest rate and 
hours of labor are all relatively smaller under the floating exchange rate regime (blue line) than 
under the fixed exchange rate regime (green line). For the output gap and marginal cost the 
absolute value of IRFs under both regimes are initially equal, but for the floating rate they start 
positive. However, fluctuations in the IRFs are smaller under floating vis-à-vis fixed exchange 
rate. Obviously, in the short-run under the floating exchange rate regime, there is a jump in the 
real exchange rate and terms of trade that are greater than those in the fixed rate regime, which 
then leads to greater negative effects on net exports. Since 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝐻,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑠𝑡 , for the starting point 
of the IRF, there are some differences between  𝑝𝑡 and 𝑝𝐻,𝑡 under the floating exchange rate, but 
there are no such differences under the fixed rate. This leads to the greater positive effect on the 
terms of trade under the floating exchange rate regime and consequently for the real exchange 
28 
 
rate and the absolute value of net exports. For CPI inflation, 𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋𝐻,𝑡 + 𝛼∆𝑠𝑡 , under the 
floating rate 𝜋𝐻,𝑡 and ∆𝑠𝑡 remain negative, so CPI inflation also remains negative after an initial 
jump (due to the starting point), but under the fixed rate  𝜋𝐻,𝑡 is positive, and so is CPI inflation. 
For other variables the effects are roughly the same. Table 5 summarizes the results. It indicates 
the initial responses for real variables, 𝑦𝑡, 𝑐𝑡, and 𝑛𝑡, are larger (more negative) and oscillate 
under the fixed exchange rate, whereas the initial responses for these variables are smaller and 
then the return to equilibrium is smoother and more direct, without overshooting, under the 
floating rate.  The relatively larger variation in output, and therefore the output gap, is the 
primary source of the greater welfare losses under the fixed exchange rate regime reported in 
Table 3 above.  The initial responses for 𝑠𝑡 and 𝑞𝑡 are larger (more positive) under the float as 
we would expect.  The initial responses for inflation (both CPI and home price inflation), interest 
rates and the real exchange rate are negative under the float and positive under the fixed 
exchange rate regime.   
The Response to a U.S. Preference Shock 
Now, consider the effects of a negative one standard deviation preference shock in the 
US economy, which immediately propagates to Mexico as the demand side effect of the financial 
crisis.  The blue line in Figure 9 displays the impulse responses of the preference shock under the 
floating exchange rate, while the green line represents impulse responses under the fixed 
exchange rate and the red line shows the buffer effect. Table 6 also compares the IRF results for 
selected variables under both floating and fixed exchange rate regimes side by side. It shows the 
initial response for real variables are smaller under the float vis-à-vis the fixed exchange rate 
regime. The shock decreases consumption, output, interest rate, CPI inflation, natural interest 
rate, MC and output gap in U.S. and it takes 11 quarters to dissipate. In Mexico under the 
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floating exchange rate, the negative responses of the impulse responses of output, consumption, 
output gap, marginal cost, hours of labor, CPI level, domestic prices, domestic goods inflation 
and CPI inflation are smaller vis-à-vis those of the fixed exchange rate case. The floating 
exchange rate absorbs part of each shock as there is a permanent positive change in the nominal 
exchange rate. It increases to 1.46 percent above the steady state and then stays at the new level 
about 0.5 percent higher than the steady state. Also there is a permanent negative effect on both 
the CPI level and domestic prices. The CPI first increases to 0.5 and then decreases to negative 
values, while home prices decline to -0.11 percent and decrease permanently to -0.38 percent.  
Under the fixed exchange rate, there is a permanent negative effect on Mexico’s domestic prices 
and CPI level. The rest of variables return to their initial steady state in at most 15 quarters. 
Again, as we previously mentioned regarding the supply side shock, the effects of shocks on the 
real exchange rate and terms of trade are greater under floating exchange rate regime than the 
fixed, which leads to a smaller positive effect on net exports. Comparing the demand side shock 
with the previous supply side shock we see that the effects of preference shocks dissipate 









Table 6: Responses to Preference Shock (𝜀ð𝑡∗) 












𝐽𝑡   -0.3 Negative 10Q -0.3 Negative 10Q 
?̃?𝑡  -0.2 Negative 8Q -2.3 Negative 8Q 
𝑦𝑡  -1 Negative 8Q -3 Negative 8Q 
𝑐𝑡  -0.4 Negative 8Q -3 Negative 8Q 
𝑛𝑥𝑡   -0.2 Negative 10Q -0.1 Negative 13Q 
𝑛𝑡   0.5 Positive 13Q 1.5 Positive 13Q 
𝑠𝑡  1.2 Positive 13Q 0.2 Positive 13Q 
𝑞𝑡  0.6 Positive 13Q 0.1 Positive 13Q 
𝜋𝐻,𝑡  -0.1 Negative 10Q -0.5 Negative 10Q 
𝜋𝑡   0.5 Positive/Negative 10Q -0.4 Negative 10Q 
𝑖𝑡  -0.2 Negative 13Q 0.08 Positive 13Q 






















A Potential Response by Monetary Policy Authorities 
    To simulate the Mexican monetary authority’s response at the time of the financial crisis, 
during which the policy regime was inflation targeting with a floating exchange rate, a one 
standard deviation shock is given to the interest rate in the monetary policy rule for Mexico. 
Figure 10 and Table 7 display the impulse responses of the monetary policy shock, again, under 
the floating exchange rate regime. This monetary policy shock, affects 16 other macroeconomic 
variables. The effects nearly vanish in about 10 periods for all variables except the CPI level, the 
effective nominal exchange rate and Mexico prices, which exhibit a permanent positive effect. 
Since a fixed exchange rate regime is an alternative to a Taylor-type policy rule, there is no need 
to consider a monetary policy shock under the fixed exchange rate regime.      
Table 7: Responses to Mexico Monetary policy shock (𝜀𝔜𝑡) 








𝔜𝑡 -1 Negative 10Q 
?̃?𝑡 1.9 Positive 11Q 
𝑦𝑡 1.9 Positive 11Q 
𝑐𝑡 2.1 Positive 10Q 
𝑛𝑥𝑡  -0.9 Negative 11Q 
𝑛𝑡  -1.9 Positive 11Q 
𝑠𝑡 0.9 Positive 11Q 
𝑞𝑡 0.5 Positive 11Q 
𝜋𝐻,𝑡 0.5 Positive 11Q 
𝜋𝑡  0.8 Positive 8Q 
𝑖𝑡 -0.03 Negative 11Q 


























Fixed or Float?  A Comparison of the Response to External Shocks under Fixed and 
Floating Exchange Rate Regimes 
 Table 8, provides the numerical differences between the values of impulse responses of 
selected variables under the floating and fixed exchange rate regimes quarter by quarter for a 
technology shock.24 We label the difference between the two, the floating exchange rate buffer – 
i.e., the amount by which the impact of the external shock on the domestic economy is lessened 
by allowing the exchange rate to float.   
As indicated in Figure 8 and also in Table 8, there is a positive buffer (or the response is 
less under float vis-à-vis fixed exchange rate) for output, hours of labor, consumption, output gap 
and marginal cost which remains until the second quarter and then turns to negative differences. 
However, the fluctuations in IRFs of most variables are greater under the fixed exchange rate. 
One exception among all the non-price variables is the net exports, which initially has a smaller 
response in the fixed exchange rate regime because of the greater terms of trade response under 
floating, as discussed in the previous section. Therefore, because the impact on non-price 
aggregates of the domestic economy was significantly less, the potential dislocations from the 
external shock were dampened as a result of the float.  E.g., in the first quarter, under the float, 
the supply side shock causes a deviation of GDP from its steady state value of about 0.49 percent 
whereas it is about 0.70 percent under the fixed rate regime.  For consumption it is 0.38 percent 
vs 0.63 percent. Also the first quarter deviation from the steady state value of hours of labor 
under the float is -0.29 percent, while it is about -0.50 percent under the fixed rate. The buffer 
effectively disappears after four quarters.  
 
                                                          
24 Table F.1, in Appendix F, provides the numerical values of impulse responses of selected variables 
under the floating and fixed exchange rate regimes quarter by quarters and the differences between the 
two for a technology shock. We report section C of that table here again for the convenience.     
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Table 8: Floating rate buffer effect for productivity shock 


























































































For total CPI inflation there is essentially no positive buffer. Under the fixed exchange 
rate regime both CPI and domestic inflation start with positive values and then return to steady 
state levels slowly. Under the floating exchange rate regime CPI inflation starts with a positive 
value and then there is a sharp decline which makes the CPI inflation negative until the 13th 
quarter. The impact of the supply side shock on domestic inflation is small and negative. Thus, 
we see that for a supply side shock the costs of the positive buffer for real variables, like GDP 





Table 9: Floating rate buffer effect for preference shock 


























































































Similarly with the preference shock there is a clearer positive buffer for real variables, 
and also the CPI inflation response is almost the same under both exchange rate regimes (with 
one lag difference). Unlike the supply side shock, there is a positive buffer for CPI and home 
prices under floating exchange rate vis-à-vis the fixed rate regime. For net exports, IRFs under 
both fixed and floating rates are positive, but the impact is smaller under the float. This is due to 
larger responses of terms of trade and real exchange rate under the floating vis-à-vis the fixed 




 Overall the benefits of a floating exchange rate regime are clear.  The potential negative 
effects of the US financial crisis on output and employment are lessened and the external shocks 
are significantly dampened by changes in prices and the nominal exchange rate. The welfare 
analysis also clearly shows that welfare losses are less under the floating exchange rate regime 
and highest under the fixed exchange rate regime. 
Conclusion 
The results presented above illustrate the ability of a floating exchange rate to absorb 
external shocks, limiting their consequences on the real domestic economy. We examine the 
effects of both supply side and demand side shocks that result from the US financial crisis upon 
the Mexican economy under fixed and floating exchange rate regimes as well as the effects of a 
potential monetary policy response by both U.S. and Mexican monetary authorities. We 
modified the small open economy DSGE model developed in Gali and Monacelli (2005) and 
Gali (2008) to include the possibility of a preference shock in each country and then calibrated 
the model with Mexico as the home country to see the transmission mechanism of the external 
shocks and the impulse response functions of the major macroeconomic variables.  
Welfare analysis clearly reveals that the volatility of domestic inflation and the output 
gap are greater in the fixed rate regime. Welfare losses are the lowest under the floating 
exchange rate with CPI targeting regime vis-à-vis the fixed and two other alternative central 
bank policy rules. The reason welfare losses are smaller under the floating exchange rate is that 
the adjustment paths are more direct without overshooting, so the volatility of domestic inflation 
and the output gap are smaller and consequently the welfare losses are smaller. 
The variance decompositions also illustrate that under both exchange rate regimes the 
effects on U.S. GDP, consumption and natural output are greater in response to the productivity 
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shock vis-à-vis the preference and monetary shocks. Under the fixed exchange rate regime the 
variance in the Mexican interest rate is much more attributable (80%) to the productivity shock 
than under the floating rate (about 1%). This clearly shows that there are two different channels 
under fixed and floating exchange rate regimes through which U.S. supply and demand side 
shocks affect the Mexican economy.  Under both regimes the preference shock generates most of 
the effects on the U.S. interest rate, natural interest rate and on Mexico’s natural output, natural 
interest rate, terms of trade and real exchange rate. For the rest of variables most of the effects 
are explained by each countries’ monetary policy responses. The fixed exchange rate regime 
makes the foreign linkages tighter and effects on the domestic economy larger.  
Our results indicate the effect of U.S. financial crisis on U.S. and Mexico output would 
persist 13 quarters for the supply side shock. This shock has a temporary effect on most of 
Mexico’s macroeconomic variables, but these effects are larger (negative) and fluctuations are 
greater, with overshooting in the IRFs for real variables under the fixed exchange rate regime 
vis-à-vis the floating exchange rate regime. The effects on prices are also quite different. For the 
fixed exchange rate regime prices increase and then stay positive.  Whereas under the floating 
rate regime domestic prices start from zero and then there is a small decrease. They equilibrate at 
a new negative level. Thus, for home prices there is a small negative permanent effect under the 
floating exchange rate regime. The CPI level and nominal exchange rate also experience a 
permanent decline. Accordingly, under the fixed exchange rate regime there is a larger negative 
effect on real variables and the inflationary response of the price variables. Whereas for the 
floating exchange rate regime there is a deflationary response and a negative permanent effect on 
the nominal exchange rate, home prices and the CPI level, and shorter effects on real variables. 




The difference in IRFs under these two exchange rate regimes, the buffer, is also 
calculated.  For a productivity shock, the buffer is positive for GDP, consumption and hours of 
labor, clearly illustrating the positive difference among major real aggregates of the model under 
the fixed exchange rate regime vis-à-vis the floating rate regime. This positive difference 
vanishes after two quarters. However, the fluctuations in IRFs of aggregates are larger under the 
fixed exchange rate. The dampening of the effects on real variables is at the cost of deflation 
under the floating exchange rate regime vis-à-vis the fixed rate regime.   
For a US-Mexico preference shock, consumption, output, the interest rate, natural interest 
rate, MC, CPI inflation and output gap all decrease in the U.S. and these effects dissipate in less 
than 15 quarters (for most about 11 quarters). Under the floating exchange rate regime there is a 
permanent effect on the nominal exchange rate, home prices and CPI level, while under the fixed 
exchange rate, there is a permanent negative effect on Mexico’s home prices and CPI level. Our 
results also illustrate how the floating exchange rate ameliorates the effects of foreign 
disturbances on the domestic economy. This is in line with other non-DSGE studies such as 
Edwards and Yeyati (2005).  
In addition, we investigated the effect of a potential monetary policy response, a decrease 
in interest rates by both the U.S. and Mexico’s monetary authorities. For Mexico’s monetary 
policy shock, under the floating rate regime, we found a permanent positive effect on the CPI 
level, the effective nominal exchange rate and Mexico’s prices. This shock also has a temporary 
effect on most other variables, which vanishes in less than 10 quarters. 
Overall, our results indicate that the floating exchange rate regime in place at the time of 
the US financial crisis limited the potential negative consequences on output, consumption and 
43 
 
employment in Mexico that would have resulted under a fixed exchange rate monetary policy 




Endogenous Crises: Minsky Frictions in a Small Open Economy 
Introduction 
The global financial crisis made clear that the financial sector and financial frictions play 
an integral role in the macroeconomy. DSGE modelers are quickly incorporating these in 
different ways. The recent work of Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2011, henceforth CTW), 
with roots in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999, henceforth BGG), incorporates financial 
frictions in the accumulation and management of capital25. “Entrepreneurs” as the borrower 
agents who operate and manage capital are introduced. These agents have their own financial 
resources, but their skill in managing capital is such that it is optimal for them to acquire and 
manage more capital than their own resources can support by borrowing additional funds. These 
individual entrepreneurs are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks which are observed only 
by them and can affect their net worth and ultimately their ability to borrow. When a shock 
occurs that reduces the value of the entrepreneur’s assets and their ability to borrow, they acquire 
less capital and this translates into a reduction in investment and ultimately into a slowdown in 
the economy (CTW, 2011). 
Although current financial friction mechanisms can replicate the results of a financial 
crisis, the real world financial system is more sophisticated than typically depicted. E.g., in CTW 
(2011) the role of the banks is neutral, i.e. a bank is not a risk taking financial intermediary, and 
the model isn’t designed to analyze banking crises. Therefore, the main objective of this paper is 
to expand the CTW DSGE financial friction framework by introducing risk taking behavior on 
the part of banks, which may then lead to a moment of crisis, a Minsky moment. As mentioned 
in Janet Yellen’s speech “A Minsky Meltdown: Lessons for Central Bankers” (2009) the 
                                                          
25 Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2013), “Risk Shocks”, also focuses on this type of financial friction. 
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dramatic events of 2008 are the classic case of systemic breakdown that Minsky envisioned. So, 
we change the banks to Minsky risky debt accumulators by introducing three different types of 
entrepreneurs with different roles that borrow from banks: hedge, speculative and Ponzi 
borrowers (entrepreneurs). Hedge borrowers can pay their debt and cover both interest and the 
principal from current cash flows from investment. Speculative borrowers can cover the interest, 
but must re-borrow the principal. And Ponzi borrowers cannot currently cover both interest and 
principal, but they believe that appreciation of the value of the asset will be sufficient to repay 
the debt (Minsky, 1992). In addition, based on how risky the borrower is and which state of 
nature is realized, banks will set the optimal rate of return for loans.  
Moreover, we believe that the idiosyncratic productivity shock, which in the typical 
model is on the demand side of the market for loanable funds, is not the sole source of financial 
instability. Alternatively we focus on the supply side of this market, following Minsky’s 
financial instability hypothesis (FIH) and introduce a new mechanism for financial frictions. We 
make an explicit link between the state of nature and accumulation of debt, which is now absent 
in the current DSGE literature. We solve the model under two different scenarios: first when the 
states of nature are exogenous and the banks do not accumulate profit over time, second for the 
endogenous states of nature and the accumulation of banks’ profit over time. We show that when 
the state of nature is endogenously a function of past history and the relative state of the business 
cycle,  a banking crisis may occur which then leads to the reduction in accumulation of capital, 
investment, and GDP. We introduce a new shock, which we call the “Minsky system risk”. This 
shock captures excessive system risk which occurs within a banking network due to 
intermediation and interconnection among banks and it is in line with some recent studies like 
Farboodi (2015). Minsky’s FIH says that over periods of prolonged prosperity and optimism 
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about future economic prospects, banks (lenders) in seeking higher returns devote more 
resources to riskier borrowers (Ponzi), which can make the economic system more vulnerable to 
collapse in the case of default. For example, high and rising interest rates can force hedge 
financing units into speculative financing and speculative financing units into Ponzi financing. 
Ponzi financing units cannot carry on too long. Feedback from revealed financial weakness of 
some units affects the willingness of bankers to debt finance a wide variety of entities. Unless 
offset by government spending, the decline in investment leads to a slowdown in the economy 
(Minsky, 1977). So we add this mechanism to the current entrepreneurial idiosyncratic 
productivity shock mechanism in CTW (2011) as another source of financial instability. Finally, 
we calculate the likelihood of an endogenous Minsky moment (or financial crisis) based on 
banks’ profit maximization problem. 
Section 2 provides some background on Minsky’s FIH and other DSGE studies with 
financial friction. Section 3 lays out the model and specifications of financial frictions for two 
different scenarios of exogenous and endogenous states of nature and shows how the Minsky 
frictions may lead to financial instability. Section 4 concludes. 
Background 
There are several types of financial frictions in the DSGE literature. Akinci and Queralto 
(2014) develop a model with financial intermediaries, in which the strength of banks’ balance 
sheets is endogenously affected by issuing new equity. Banks face occasionally binding leverage 
constraints and the model can account for occasional financial crises as a result of nonlinearities 
generated by the constraints. They find the optimal condition for the choice of equity issuance 
and they show that it should be occasionally binding. While their approach can occasionally 
generate financial crises, there is no theoretical framework behind this mechanism to explain 
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how these occasions occur.  They simply assume that there is a positive probability for these 
occasions to occur. Fornaro (2015) follows the same path with emphasis on features of 
international credit markets. Christiano and Ikeda (2013) introduce a risky banking system with 
an agency problem between bankers and creditors. They introduce a new financial sector 
between households and banks called mutual funds. Banks must exert effort in order to earn high 
returns for their creditors. An agency problem arises because banker effort is not observable to 
creditors. They show that social welfare increases by restricting bank leverage relative to the 
leverage in unregulated financial market. With less leverage, banks are in a position to use their 
net worth to insulate creditors in case there are losses on bank’s balance sheets. Their model 
implies that by reducing risk to creditors, agency problems are mitigated and the efficiency of the 
banking system is improved. However, here we focus on the financial friction mechanism, 
introduced by CTW (2011) which is in the accumulation and management of capital between 
banks and borrowers by using Minsky FIH which is completely a different framework. We make 
the bank’s profit maximization problem as the function of the state of the business cycle which is 
absent in the current literature. It should be mentioned that in our study we solve the model for 
an unregulated financial market. Solving the model for the regulated market and illustrating how 
regulations may postpone or even prevent the occurrence of Minsky moment might be a topic for 
future studies. However, the fact that deregulation of the financial market usually occurs over the 
prolonged good state of nature and it becomes heavily regulated during the bad states of nature is 
already considered in the second hypothesis of the Minsky FIH.  In addition, in our model all 
agents are rational. i.e., the rational action for the banker is to lend more and more money even to 
Ponzi borrowers during the good state of nature because they can gain benefits by selling the 
collaterals with higher prices in future. And for the Ponzi borrower the rational action is to get as 
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much as possible loans because in a good state of nature they can sell their (capital) products in a 
higher price than the value of their collaterals. That’s why they have the tendency to default.    
CTW (2011) considers borrowers (entrepreneurs) and lenders (banks) as agents with 
different information. The presence of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders 
leads to a focus on the balance sheets of entrepreneurs. These individual entrepreneurs are 
subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks that are observed only by them and that can affect 
their net worth and ultimately their ability to borrow. Banks extend entrepreneurs a “standard 
debt contract”, which specifies a loan amount and a given interest payment. Entrepreneurs who 
suffer an especially bad idiosyncratic productivity (income) shock, and therefore cannot afford to 
pay the required interest, are “bankrupt”. Banks pay the cost of monitoring these entrepreneurs 
and take all of their net worth in partial compensation for the interest that they are owned. The 
amount that banks are willing to lend to an entrepreneur under the standard debt contract then is 
a function of the entrepreneur’s net worth. The debt contracts extended by banks to entrepreneurs 
are financed by issuing liabilities to households. In addition to their accumulated savings, 
households can also borrow foreign funds to deposit in banks. When a shock occurs that reduces 
the value of the entrepreneur’s assets, their ability to borrow is reduced. As a result, they acquire 
less capital and this translates into a reduction in investment and ultimately into a slowdown in 
the economy (CTW, 2011). As mentioned earlier, this framework is the same as BGG (1999). 
The difference between CTW (2011) and BGG (1999) is in the nonfinancial parts of the model 
and the way that the model meets data.  
While we keep this framework, inspired by Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis we 
expand it by introducing different types of entrepreneurs as well as a new mechanism of banking 
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system failure. The second theorem26 of the Minsky’s FIH says that over periods of prolonged 
prosperity and optimism about future economic prospects, banks (lenders) devote more resources 
to riskier borrowers (Ponzi), which can make the economic system more vulnerable to collapse 
in the case of default (Minsky, 1992). Figure 1 shows that data27 are consistent with Minsky’s 
FIH. Commercial and industrial loans decrease sharply after the recessions and again increase 
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 Figure 11: Minsky’s FIH in Data 
Minsky’s FIH proposes that banking system failure, as an accelerator, should be at the 
heart of business cycle crises and it rejects the normal inter-temporal role of the financial system 
(White, 2015). Accordingly, Minsky recognizes no tendency in the financial system toward 
inter-temporal equilibrium, even in the absence of external disturbances. Instead the financial 
                                                          
26 The first theorem of the FIH says that the economy has financing regimes under which it is stable, and 
financing regimes in which it is unstable.  
 
27 FRED, 2015- Commercial and Industrial Loans- All Commercial Banks 
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system tends to puff itself up until it explodes. White (2015) believes that in FIH there is not a 
satisfactory account of why, in the absence of exogenously shifting constraints, we should find 
investors, in Flonders’s words, “systematically behaving in a way that leads to increasingly 
speculative activity” (2015, 85). We disagree with White’s belief. We think that the answer of 
this “why”, is the linkage between the state of nature of the economy and the accumulation of 
debt, i.e., banking system profit maximization, which is neglected by White and is explained by 
Minsky, but with a vague mechanism. However, the introduction of the “Minsky system risk” 
shock in a DSGE framework resolves White’s first criticism regarding no tendency in the 
financial system toward inter-temporal equilibrium, but at the cost of deviation from complete 
endogeneity presumed by Minsky. We also answer White’s second criticism by explaining the 
banking system profit maximization mechanism. However, our effort in following Minsky’s FIH 
does not mean that we always agree with Minsky. So if Minsky, according to White (2015), 
recognizes no tendency in the financial system toward inter-temporal equilibrium, this is the 
departure point of our work from Minsky’s. 
Keen’s (1995, 2013) model of Minsky’s FIH displays qualitative characteristics that 
match the real macroeconomic and income-distributional outcomes of the last fifteen years; a 
period of economic volatility followed by a period of moderation, leading to a rise of instability 
and a serious economic crisis. He builds a strictly monetary macroeconomic model which can 
generate the real phenomena manifested by both The Great Moderation and The Great 
Recession. However, his work does not consider a general equilibrium mechanism. It is about 
disequilibrium and instabilities, and is categorized as a rival theory to the equilibrium theories in 
the DSGE literature.     
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 Therefore, in the next section we develop a model in which the banking system is subject 
to risky behavior. Banks try to set the optimal rate of returns for loans. These rates are different 
among borrowers based on the realized state of nature. We solve the model under two different 
scenarios: first when the states of nature are exogenous and the banks do not accumulate profit 
over time, second for the endogenous states of nature and banks’ accumulate profits over time. 
We show that when the state of nature is endogenously a function of past history and the relative 
state of the business cycle, if enough good state of nature is realized a banking crisis originates 
which ultimately leads to the Minsky moment and a sharp decline in investment and GDP. 
Finally, we calculate the likelihood of an endogenous Minsky moment (the banking crisis) based 
on the bank’s profit maximization problem. 
The Model: State of Nature, Entrepreneurs and Banks 
The baseline DSGE model is that of CTW (2011). We introduce a Minsky financial 
friction mechanism, based on risk taking banks, and derive a new set of optimality conditions. 
Then we make appropriate adjustments to link this new friction with the rest of baseline DSGE 
model. So we will end up with a complete DSGE model that has 80 endogenous variables and 25 
potential exogenous shocks. The model is then ready to meet the data and it can be calibrated or 
estimated. For the introduction of Minsky friction, when the state of nature is exogenous there is 
no endogenous link between the business cycle components of the model and the realized state 
of nature. Basically the probability of the state of nature is a discrete variable which updates 
itself based on Bayes rule each period. For the second case, the state of nature is endogenously a 
function of past history and the relative state of the business cycle. Under this scenario the 
probability of the state of nature has a continuous distribution. For any of the infinite possible 
states of nature a corresponding probability exists. In this case, the probability distribution is 
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divided into four sections. Thus, we derive not only the optimality conditions for each type of 
entrepreneur, but also the three switching points across four states of nature based upon the types 
of lenders in the market. This allows us to find the likelihood of a Minsky moment in each 
period.  
Exogenous State of Nature: 
State of Nature 
First, we expand the probability mechanism introduced by Bhattacharya et al. (2015).  At 
any date 𝑡 =  0, … , 𝑇, the economy can be in one of four states, denoted by 𝑔 ("good"/up 
state/expansion), n (“normal”/neutral state/no growth), 𝑏 ("bad"/down state/contraction) and m 
(“Minsky moment”/crisis state) respectively. For example, the "good" state at time t is denoted 
by 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡−1𝑔 , which contains the accumulation of all previous state of natures 𝑠𝑡−1 plus the 
time t state of nature “good”. The set of all states is 𝑠𝑡 ∈ 𝑆 =
{0, 𝑔, 𝑏, 𝑛,𝑚, … , 𝑔𝑔, 𝑔𝑏, 𝑔𝑛, 𝑛𝑔, 𝑏𝑔, 𝑏𝑛, 𝑛𝑏, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑛𝑛,𝑚𝑚 … , 𝑠𝑡𝑔, 𝑠𝑡𝑏, 𝑠𝑡𝑛… }. This means that 
the state of nature accumulates over time. The probability that a good state occurs at any point in 
time is denoted by 𝜃𝑔, which is chosen by nature. Also, the probability that a normal state occurs 
is denoted by 𝜃𝑛 , for bad state is 𝜃𝑏 and for the Minsky state is 𝜃𝑚. Again we assume 𝜃𝑖 ∈
{𝜃1
𝑖 , 𝜃2
𝑖} with 1 > 𝜃1
𝑖 > 𝜃2
𝑖 > 0 and  𝑖 = 𝑔, 𝑛, 𝑏, 𝑚. However, agents (banks and entrepreneurs) 
do not know these probabilities and try to infer them by observing past realizations of good, 
normal, bad and Minsky states. Agents have priors 𝑃𝑟(𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃1
𝑖) and 𝑃𝑟(𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃2
𝑖) that the true 
probability is 𝜃1
𝑖   or 𝜃2
𝑖  respectively and   𝑖 = 𝑔, 𝑛, 𝑏, 𝑚. Their subjective belief in state 𝑠𝑡 of a 
good state occurring at 𝑡 + 1 is denoted by 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑔
 , that of the normal state is denoted by 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑛 , for 
Minsky state is denoted by 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑚 and for the bad state is 𝜋𝑠𝑡





probabilities depend on the whole history of realizations up to time 𝑡. In other words, for a good 
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state of nature 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑔
= 𝑃𝑟𝑠𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑡𝑔|𝑠0, … , 𝑠𝑡). Given our notation, state 𝑠𝑡 completely 
summarizes the history of realizations up to t. Thus, 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑔
= 𝑃𝑟𝑠𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑡𝑔|𝑠0, … , 𝑠𝑡) =
𝑃𝑟𝑠𝑡(𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑡𝑔|𝑠𝑡). We assume that past realizations of the states of the world are observable 
by all agents, thus there is no information asymmetry on top of the imperfect information28 
structure among all agents in terms of the realization of the probability of the states of nature but 
following CTW (2011) there is asymmetry information between banks and entrepreneurs in 
terms of the realization of the entrepreneur’s productivity (income) shocks. 
 All agents are Bayesian updaters29 and try to learn from past realizations the true 
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where 𝑟 is the number of good state realizations up to time 𝑡. Then, 
                                                          
28 Agents do not know the actual values of 𝜃𝑖 ∈ {𝜃1
𝑖 , 𝜃2
𝑖 } probabilities and try to infer them. So, obviously 
there is imperfect information.  
 
29 All agents are rational and Bayesian updater. In our model there is not Knightian uncertainty, but there 
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As the number of good realizations increases, the subjective probability of the good state being 





(Bhattacharya et al., 2015)   
There is an analogous probability for the normal, bad and Minsky states as well (See Appendix 
A). 
Thus, equation (2) and its three analogous equations (in Appendix A) describe the probability of 
each of the four states of nature. In this section we have described the states of nature that we are 
adding to CTW (2011). In the next three subsections of the section 3 we describe entrepreneurs 
and banks in details. Then we solve the entrepreneurs’ welfare maximization problem with 
respect to constraints imposed to them by banks (banks’ zero profit condition) to find the optimal 
values of the leverage term 𝜚𝑡 , and the cut off values of the productivity shock, ?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  and ?̅?𝑡+1
𝑠 . 
In section 4 we solve the model again for the endogenous states of nature. Then we replace the 
optimality conditions with the current framework of CTW (2011) and make the proper 
modifications.  
Entrepreneurs 
At each period of time 𝑡 ∈ {0,1, … , 𝑇} banks face three different type of entrepreneurs or 
borrowers; hedge borrowers, who can pay their debt and cover both interest and the principal 
from current cash flows from investment, speculative borrowers, who can cover the interest but 
55 
 
the borrower must re-borrow the principal, and Ponzi borrowers, who cannot currently cover 
both interest and the principal, but believe that appreciation of the value of the asset will be 
sufficient to repay the debt (Minsky, 1992). Henceforth all variables pertaining to each type of 
entrepreneur are designated by superscript h, s and p respectively. As mentioned earlier, like 
banks, all these entrepreneurs have subjective probability about the states of nature.      
At the end of period t each entrepreneur has a level of net worth, 𝑁𝑡+1. The entrepreneur 
combines this net worth with a bank loan, 𝐵𝑡+1, to purchase new, installed physical capital, ?̅?𝑡+1, 







             (3) 
𝑗 = ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑝 
 
where 𝑃𝑡 is the domestic price of output.  𝑃𝑘′,𝑡 denotes the price of a unit of newly installed 
physical capital, which operates in period 𝑡 + 1. This price is expressed in units of the 
homogenous good, so that 𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡 is the domestic currency price of physical capital. The 
entrepreneurs are required to pay a gross interest rate, 𝑍𝑡+1 , on the bank loan at the end of period 
𝑡 + 1, if it is feasible for them to do so (CTW, 2011).  
Ex-post payoffs are independent of the history of past realizations. Banks decide how 





ℎ . Depending on the state of nature, four possible situations may be realized. The 
diagrams in Figure 2 relates them to three ranges of the state of nature and the Minsky moment 
for both endogenous and exogenous state of nature30. Since for the endogenous state of nature we 
                                                          
30 We solve the model for two cases, one when the state of nature is exogenous and discrete, another when 
the state of nature is endogenous and continuous, and simply call them endogenous or exogenous. 
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deal with a continuous pdf we call each of these situations as a separate regime. 
 
Panel a 
                                   𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑏                                       𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑛                                                     𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑔
                                      𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑚 
 Worst State of Nature                                                                                                                                                                       Best State of Nature 
        Hedge borrowers        𝜋𝑎   both Hedge and Speculative   𝜋𝑎∗   all Hedge, Speculative and Ponzi   𝜋𝑎∗∗   = Minsky Moment 
Panel b 
            bb…bb                                                                                                                                                                              gg…gg 
          H regime                    a             HS regime                      a*                HSP regime                 a**    Minsky regime  
Figure 12: Borrowers in each range of the states of nature 
 
In panel a, if 𝜋𝑡 < 𝜋𝑎, then all the banking resources would be devoted to hedge borrowers. If 
𝜋𝑎 < 𝜋𝑡 < 𝜋𝑎∗, banking resources would be allocated between both hedge and speculative 
borrowers. And, if 𝜋𝑎∗ < 𝜋𝑡 < 𝜋𝑎∗∗ , banking resources would split among all hedge, speculative 
and Ponzi borrowers. And for the exogenous case these ranges reduce to a single value of 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑏 , 
𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑛  and 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑔
, respectively. Panel b relates these probabilities to different states of nature.  𝑎∗∗ is 
the Minsky Moment, which indicates when the market fails or the economy falls into crisis 
(which has the probability of 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑚 for the exogenous case). 
Following CTW (2011), we assume after purchasing capital the entrepreneur experiences 
an idiosyncratic productivity shock which converts the purchased raw capital, ?̅?𝑡+1 into  𝜔?̅?𝑡+1 
units of effective capital, where 𝜔 is the unit mean of an idiosyncratic productivity shock, 
lognormally and independently distributed random variable across entrepreneurs. The variance 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Another difference between these two cases is in the accumulation of the bank’s profit. Under the 
exogenous state of nature, we assume no accumulation of bank’s profit over time. Basically bank’s 
revenue is equal to bank’s cost (zero profit condition). But under the endogenous state of nature, we 
assume accumulation of bank’s profit over time. This makes the maximization problem completely 
different from the first case.      
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of log𝜔 is 𝜎𝑡
2. We denote the cumulative distribution function of 𝜔 by 𝐹(𝜔; 𝜎), and its partial 
derivatives as 𝐹𝜔(𝜔; 𝜎), 𝐹𝜎(𝜔; 𝜎). The entrepreneur then sells the undepreciated part of physical 
capital to capital producers. Per unit of physical capital purchased, the entrepreneur who draws 
idiosyncratic shock 𝜔 earns a return (after taxes), of  𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 𝜔. In other words, the role of 
entrepreneurs is only to convert raw capital to effective physical capital and deliver it to capital 
producers who have the standard role defined in the DSGE literature (CTW, 2011).  
After entrepreneurs sell their capital in a homogenous capital market to capital producers, 
they settle their bank loans. At this point as it is shown in (CTW, 2011), the funds available to an 
entrepreneur who has purchased  ?̅?𝑡+1 units of physical capital in period t and who experiences 
an idiosyncratic productivity shock 𝜔, is   𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 𝜔?̅?𝑡+1 where all terms are defined above.  
Each entrepreneur experiences 𝜔 and there is a cutoff value of 𝜔, say ?̅?𝑡+1 for each type of 
entrepreneur such that the entrepreneur resources just enough to pay back the bank: 
1. An entrepreneur who experiences 𝜔 ≥ ?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  is a hedge borrower and pays:  






ℎ           (4) 
 
2. An entrepreneur who experiences ?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ > 𝜔 ≥ ?̅?𝑡+1
𝑠  is a speculative borrower and can 
pay only: 





𝑠                                   (5)     
 
3.The rest of entrepreneurs with 𝜔 < ?̅?𝑡+1
𝑠  are called Ponzi borrowers and pays nothing. 
 
We assume entrepreneurs with  𝜔 < ?̅?𝑡+1
𝑠  , or Ponzi borrowers, are bankrupt and turn over all 
their resources to the bank:  
𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 𝜔?̅?𝑡+1




𝑘  represents the period 𝑡 + 1 payoff from a unit of additional physical capital.  In this 
case, where 𝜔 < ?̅?𝑡+1
𝑠  , the bank monitors the entrepreneur, at cost 𝜇𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 𝜔?̅?𝑡+1
𝑃  where 
𝜇 > 0 is a parameter which shows the monitoring cost in terms of the fraction of resources 
available for Ponzi borrowers at the 𝑡 + 1 period (CTW, 2011). This assumption leads to 𝑍𝑡+1
𝑃 =
0. I.e., we assume that Ponzi borrowers always default and banks take all of their resources. 
Banks 
Banks obtain the funds loaned in period t to entrepreneurs by accepting deposits from 
households at a gross nominal rate of interest, 𝑅𝑡, which is the risk free rate of return. The 
subscript on 𝑅𝑡 indicates that the payoff to households in t + 1 is not contingent on the period t + 
1 uncertainty. This feature of the relationship between households and banks is simply assumed 
and there is no risk in household bank deposits.  We also assume that there is competition and 
free entry among banks, and they participate in no financial arrangements other than the 
liabilities issued to households and the loans issued to entrepreneurs. Banks do not refinance debt 
(CTW, 2011). 
For the three possible states of nature banks receive differing amounts of revenues, 𝕀𝑡+1
𝑖 , 
𝑖 = ℎ, ℎ𝑠, ℎ𝑠𝑝:  
if 𝜋𝑡 < 𝜋𝑎 bank revenue is only from the hedge borrower’s return to the bank which from 
equation (4) is: 




ℎ                      (7) 
if 𝜋𝑎 < 𝜋𝑡 < 𝜋𝑎∗ bank revenue is from both the hedge and speculative borrower’s return which 
from equation (4) plus (5) is equal to: 






𝑠                      (8) 
if 𝜋𝑎∗ < 𝜋𝑡 < 𝜋𝑎∗∗  bank revenue is from all three entrepreneurs’ return. Since Ponzi borrowers 
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will default the bank receives all their resources after paying the monitoring cost 𝜇. The bank 













𝑃      
          (9)                                   
(for the exogenous case these probabilities are 𝜋𝑠𝑡




And if a Minsky moment occurs, 𝜋𝑎∗∗ < 𝜋𝑡 (or 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑚 for exogenous case), banks not only receive 
no revenues, but also lose all profits and have to pay interest to depositor. Since banks have no 
revenue and lose all their profit they are insolvent and cannot pay the interest payments to 
depositors. This probability 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑚  is the probability of occurrence of a Minsky moment in each 
period, which here is exogenous. (In section 3.2 this probability is endogenous). 
3.1.4 Entrepreneurs’ Welfare Maximization 
Now entrepreneurs maximize welfare subject to bank’s zero profit condition according to 
the state of nature at each point of time. Bank’s zero profit condition is the budget constraint of 
this maximization problem. In doing so we find the optimal levels of the entrepreneurs’ net 
worth, cut off values of idiosyncratic productivity, the interest rate paid by different 
entrepreneurs and loan amounts received by them. Since budget constraint is mathematically 
more sophisticated and needs more manipulations we start with the budget constraint instead of 












ℎ𝑠𝑝)) = 𝑅𝑡𝐿𝑡+1                           (10) 
 
where 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑖  , 𝑖 = 𝑏, 𝑛, 𝑔,𝑚  is the probability of bad, normal, good and Minsky state of nature and 
𝜆ℳ𝑡  is the “Minsky system risk” shock.  𝐿𝑡 is the amount of total loan banks devoted to 
entrepreneurs, which is equal to total banks’ deposit at time t.  Π𝑡+1
ℎ  , Π𝑡+1





bank’s earning corresponding to bad, normal and good state of nature or corresponding to h, hs, 
hsp regimes. And we can open them up as: 
 
Π𝑡+1
ℎ = [1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵𝑡+1
ℎ ]                                           (11) 
 
Π𝑡+1







𝑠 ] + [1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵𝑡+1
ℎ ]                     (12)  
Π𝑡+1














ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵𝑡+1
ℎ ])]                                                          (13)                                                                                                
 
also, 




       (14) 







                  (15) 
𝑗 = ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑝 
all terms are previously defined. The bank zero profit condition in equation (10) consists of three 
components, each corresponding to a state of nature (g, n, b) as in Figure 2, which is then 
multiplied by the corresponding probability of that state occurring. The first component is bank 
profit when the state of nature is bad and all bank resources are devoted to hedge borrowers, 
multiplied to 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑏  which is the probability the bad state of nature occurs. The second term is bank 
profit when the state of nature is normal, 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑛  , and bank resources are split between hedge and 
speculative borrowers, and taking into account the possible speculative borrower default on the 
principal. The third term is bank profit when the state of nature is good, 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑔
 . Bank resources are 
allocated among all borrowers considering the potential default of Ponzi borrowers and bank’s 
cost of monitoring. The last term then introduces the Minsky moment. 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑚 is the probability of 
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the occurrence of a Minsky moment. This is multiplied by losses of the bank. As mentioned 
above we assume that bank has no revenue after the Minsky moment, but has to pay the interest 
to depositors. The bank is insolvent and the last term is negative.  
Following CTW (2011), next we represent the zero profit constraint (10) and rewrite the 
constraint, which is already a function of 𝐵𝑡 and 𝑍𝑡, based on a new variable that we label as the 
“leverage term” ,  𝜚𝑡 =
𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡+1
 , which is the debt to net worth ratio. Then we represent the 
entrepreneur’s welfare function and solve the welfare maximization problem to find the first 
order conditions and the Euler equation in order to find an expression for 𝐵𝑡 and 𝑍𝑡 based on the 
leverage term.   
As it is shown in Appendix B, the bank zero profit condition (budget constraint) after 
some manipulations in terms of the leverage is: 
 [𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑏 ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡)][?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 𝜚𝑡] + 𝜋𝑠𝑡


























+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1







𝑚 [([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡)][?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 𝜚𝑡]







𝑘 𝜚𝑡] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡)][?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 𝜚𝑡])













+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡)][?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ 𝑅𝑡+1





 .  
Now for the sake of tractability, let us define three new distribution functions. Each 







𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)                                   (17) 
∫ ?̅?𝑡+1





(𝜔𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑡) + 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) = 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)                        (18) 
([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡)]?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ + 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) = Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡)                        (19) 
Then with some simplification the bank’s zero profit condition (10), which is the “budget” 
constrain for entrepreneur’s maximization problem is: 
𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑏 [Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)] + 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑛 [Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)] + 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑔
[Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) −
𝜇𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)] − 𝜆ℳ𝑡𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑚[3Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1









The first three parts of the large expression are bank’s earnings (cash inflow to the bank) 
in good, normal and bad states of nature, and the last expression is the bank’s losses at Minsky 
moment. The right hand side expression of equation (20) multiplied to 𝑅𝑡 , is the share of bank’s 
revenues that goes to the depositors (cash outflow from the bank). Equation (20) is the final 
“budget” constraint which is written in terms of probability functions and productivity 
distribution. We will use this budget constraint with the following welfare function to form the 
entrepreneur’s welfare maximization problem. 
Entrepreneurs seek to maximize welfare subject to the zero profit condition of banks. 
Expressing welfare as a ratio of entrepreneur’s expected wealth at the end of the contract to the 





















ℎ (𝜔 , 𝜎𝑡) + ∫ [𝜔 𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡𝑅𝑡+1


















ℎ (𝜔 , 𝜎𝑡) + ∫ [𝜔 𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡𝑅𝑡+1






𝑆 (𝜔 , 𝜎𝑡)
3𝑅𝑡𝑁𝑡+1


















ℎ (𝜔 , 𝜎𝑡)𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡𝑅𝑡+1














ℎ (𝜔 , 𝜎𝑡)𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡𝑅𝑡+1










where 𝐸𝑡 denotes the expectations. Analogous with the procedure we used for the budget 
constraint we simplify the welfare function in terms of probability functions and productivity 
distribution.  
Using the mean equation for 𝜔 distribution and definitions (17), (18), (19) and (22)  
1 = ∫ 𝜔 𝑑𝐹 
∞
0









(𝜔 , 𝜎𝑡) + 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) 





(𝜔 , 𝜎𝑡) = 𝑀(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)                                                   (22) 
After simplification we can rewrite the welfare function (21) as 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 {[(1 − Γ(?̅?𝑡+1












𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) − 𝑀(?̅?𝑡+1







Now the entrepreneur wants to maximize welfare, equation (23), subject to the bank’s 
zero profit condition, equation (20). We find the value of 𝜚𝑡, ?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  and ?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆  which are the 
optimal leverage ratio and the cut off values in the productivity shock distribution that allows 
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entrepreneurs to maximize their welfare function. The Lagrangian representation of the welfare 





𝐸𝑡 {[(1 − Γ(?̅?𝑡+1











𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) −
𝑀(?̅?𝑡+1





𝜚𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡+1 ([𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑏 [Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)] +
𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑛 [Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)] + 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑔
[Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)] −
𝜆ℳ𝑡𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑚[3Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1




𝜚𝑡 − 3𝜚𝑡 + 3)}               (24) 
where 𝜆𝑡+1 is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions for this problem with 
respect to 𝜚𝑡, ?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ , ?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆  are: 
[ 𝜚𝑡]:    𝐸𝑡 {[(1 − Γ(?̅?𝑡+1











𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) − 𝑀(?̅?𝑡+1








ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)] + 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑛 [Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) −
𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)] + 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑔
[Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)] − 𝜆ℳ𝑡𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑚[3Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) −
𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1




− 3)} = 0                     (25) 
This first order condition shows the optimal leverage for entrepreneurs in terms of the probability 
functions and the productivity distribution, 𝜔. As mentioned earlier leverage is defined as the 
debt to net worth ratio, 𝜚𝑡 =
𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡+1







1 =  𝜚𝑡 − 1, we can calculate simply the optimal loan 𝐵𝑡+1 and net worth 𝑁𝑡+1 amounts. 





ℎ ] :   − Γ?̅?ℎ(?̅?𝑡+1
























𝜚𝑡 = 0 
          (26) 
[?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 ]:     𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑏 (𝐼?̅?𝑆(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝑀?̅?𝑆(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺?̅?𝑆(?̅?𝑡+1






𝑆  ;  𝜎𝑡)𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑏 − 𝐺?̅?𝑆(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆  ;  𝜎𝑡)𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑛 − 𝜇𝐺?̅?𝑆(?̅?𝑡+1




𝑆  ;  𝜎𝑡) + 𝐺?̅?𝑆(?̅?𝑡+1




𝜚𝑡 = 0 
          (27) 
These two first order conditions are the cut off values in idiosyncratic productivity 
distribution, 𝜔 , which divide it into three parts each corresponding to one of hedge, speculative 
and Ponzi borrowers.  
The last first order condition is with respect to 𝜆𝑡+1, which again represents the bank zero 
profit condition: 
[𝜆𝑡+1]:     [𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑏 [Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)] + 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑛 [Γ(?̅?𝑡+1









ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1





+ 3 = 0 
         (28) 
 
Now solve for the Euler equation by substituting out for 𝜆𝑡+1 from the second equation 
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into the first and third, leading to:  
𝐸𝑡 {[𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑏 (𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) − 𝑀(?̅?𝑡+1





+ [(1 − Γ(?̅?𝑡+1




ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)] + 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑛 [Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)] + 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑔
[Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝜇𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)] − 𝜆ℳ𝑡𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑚[3Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1

























𝑆  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝑀?̅?𝑆(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺?̅?𝑆(?̅?𝑡+1























𝑆  ; 𝜎𝑡)+𝐺?̅?𝑆
(?̅?𝑡+1

























ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)] + 𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑛 [Γ(?̅?𝑡+1









ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1





+ 3 = 0 
   (31) 
These are the optimality conditions for 𝜚𝑡, ?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ , ?̅?𝑡+1












− 1 =  𝜚𝑡 − 1                                           (32) 
Equation (32) shows that entrepreneur’s loan amount is a function of his net worth. Also 




































                               (34)  
These are the equilibrium interest rates entrepreneurs pay on bank loans at the end of period 𝑡 +
1. 
Aggregation 



























The same as for net worth, using the assumption of 𝐾𝑡
𝑠 = 𝐾𝑡
𝑆 = 𝐾𝑡
𝑃 = 𝐾𝑡 for ?̅?𝑡 , which is the 
amount of physical capital that entrepreneurs acquired in period 𝑡 − 1, market clearing condition 
requires: 





















          (36) 
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Now the last step is to derive the law of motion for ?̅?𝑡+1. As shown in CTW (2011), 
entrepreneur’s aggregate net worth at period 𝑡, after they have settled with the bank, is denoted 
𝑉?̅? . This is:  
  ?̅?𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡
𝑘𝑃𝑡−1𝑃𝑘′,𝑡−1𝐾𝑡 − Γ(?̅?𝑡
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡−1)𝑅𝑡
𝑘𝑃𝑡−1𝑃𝑘′,𝑡−1?̅?𝑡 
Rewriting using the definition of Γ(?̅?𝑡






































The first three terms in braces express the net revenue of the banks, which may be written as 










 } (𝑃𝑡−1𝑃𝑘′,𝑡−1?̅?𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡) 
 (38) 
Each entrepreneur faces an identical and independent probability of 1 − 𝛾𝑡 of exiting the 
economy and the complementary probability of 𝛾𝑡 of remaining in the economy. Because of the 
random selection, the net worth of the entrepreneur who remains is 𝛾𝑡?̅?𝑡. To ensure that these 
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survivors and new arrivals who remain in the economy, have sufficient funds to obtain at least 
some amount of loans, we assume based on CTW (2011), they receive a transfer 𝑊𝑡
𝑒 from 
households, which is the wealth transfer. This is due to the fact that some entrepreneurs leave the 
market. So ?̅?𝑡+1 has another component which is 1 − 𝛾𝑡 .  To accommodate this we assume that 
remaining entrepreneurs receive an equivalent wealth transfer, otherwise the market does not 
clear. So the average net worth of all entrepreneurs after receiving 𝑊𝑡
𝑒 is ?̅?𝑡+1 = 𝛾𝑡?̅?𝑡 +𝑊𝑡
𝑒  or, 
?̅?𝑡+1 = 𝛾𝑡 {𝑅𝑡
𝑘𝑃𝑡−1𝑃𝑘′,𝑡−1?̅?𝑡 − [𝑅𝑡−1 +








𝑒                  (39) 
 Now, we have first order conditions and Euler equations which we can add to CTW 
(2011) as a new financial friction mechanism. These aggregation equations link the financial part 
of the model to the rest of the model, which is available in CTW (2011). Another important 
addition we would like to make is allowing the state of nature to be endogenous, so now we 
solve the model for the endogenous state of nature when banks accumulate profit over time. 
Then we calculate three threshold levels endogenously based on bank’s profit maximization 
problem. In particular, we are interested to calculate the likelihood of Minsky moment.  
Endogenous State of Nature 
In this section first we solve the welfare maximization problem for each type of entrepreneur 
and then bank’s profit maximization problem with respect to bank’s budget constraints. We end 
this section with the aggregation of the model, and calculation of the likelihood of the Minsky 
moment endogenously which is a function of the leverage term and the cut off values in the 
productivity distribution, based on bank’s profit maximization problem. Compared to previous 
section, the exogenous state of nature setting, the maximization problem is quite different. First, 
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here the probability of the state of nature is completely endogenous and is continuous. In section 
3.1, there is an exogenous and discrete probability associated with each of the four cases: good, 
normal, bad and Minsky.  Here the probability of the state of nature has a continuous 
distribution, and for the infinite possible states of nature a corresponding probability is involved. 
That is because here under the endogenous state of nature scenario we deal with four intervals 
(regimes) rather than a single value for the probability of the state of the nature under the 
exogenous scenario. This probability distribution is divided into four intervals (regimes) 
associated with the states examined above, defined by three “threshold points”. Ultimately, the 
solution of each optimization problem is a function of this distribution. We assume 𝜋𝑠𝑡  is a 
normally and independently distributed random variable across all possible states of nature, with 
mean ?̅?𝑠𝑡and variance 𝜎𝑠
2. The 𝑡 subscript indicates that the mean changes over time while for 
simplicity we assume the variance remains constant. While 𝜎𝑠
2 is a function of the wealth31 
inequality among agents, we assume for simplicity all have the same wealth (Of course a natural 
extension of our model is to relax this assumption). We denote the probability distribution 
function (PDF) of 𝜋𝑠𝑡  by ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡 , 𝜎𝑠), the cumulative distribution function (CDF) by 𝐻(?̅?𝑠𝑡 , 𝜎𝑠),  
and its partial derivative as ℎ𝜋(?̅?𝑠𝑡 , 𝜎𝑠). 
Second, there is a law of motion for this probability distribution. The mean of this probability 
distribution is a function of past history and the relative state of the business cycle. We assume 
the mean of the probability of the state of nature is a function of GDP per capita growth rate. 
This mechanism is completely different from equations (2) in section 3.1 above where the 
probability is determined exogenously and it uses Bayesian rule to update for the next period. 
Accordingly, for the mean of the PDF we assume 
                                                          
31 Wealth is different from the net worth of the entrepreneurs in this context (See page 29). We define net 
worth in equation (3). However, here 𝜎𝑠
2 could be the function of either wealth or net worth inequality. 
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?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 = ?̅?𝑠𝑡 + (𝑔𝑡+1 − 𝑛𝑡+1)                                          (40) 
where ?̅?𝑠𝑡 is the mean of the PDF of the state of nature, 𝑔𝑡 is the growth rate of GDP and 𝑛𝑡 is 
the growth rate of the labor force. With this assumption, when 𝑔𝑡 > 𝑛𝑡 , the mean of the past 
realized probability of the state of nature increases, which could be interpreted as moving toward 
a good state of nature (economic expansion). When 𝑔𝑡 < 𝑛𝑡, the past realized probability 
decreases, which is considered as moving back toward the bad states (recession).  
Third, banks accumulate profit over time. For the previous case, exogenous state of 
nature, following CTW (2011) we assume that banks cannot accumulate their profit. This means 
that in each period returns on loans to the bank should be equal to bank’s return on deposits to 
the households. That’s why we simply use bank’s zero profit function as a “budget” constraint. 
This is quite different here. For the endogenous case we assume the amount of loans that banks 
can lend to entrepreneurs not only is a function of current period deposits, but also a function of 
present value of the banks’ last period profit. This leads to accumulation of profit over time. 
Entrepreneurs’ Welfare Maximization Problem 
 In the demand side of the market for loanable funds entrepreneurs maximize their utility 
(welfare) functions with respect to their loan budget constraints. Compared to exogenous case, 
the utility function is almost the same (except here an endogenous probability function is 
involved rather than an exogenous probability value), but the budget constraint, as explained 
above, is quite different. That’s because banks accumulate profit over time. Following CTW 
(2011), the entrepreneurial welfare (utility) function is defined as the entrepreneur’s expected 
“relative wealth” 32 at the end of the contract. Also, the productivity shock distribution function is 
as defined in the previous section. We solve this welfare optimization problem to find the 
                                                          
32 Net welfare and expected wealth are different from the net worth of the entrepreneurs. Net worth is one 
of the variables in the welfare function of the entrepreneurs. 
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entrepreneurs’ optimal net worth, loan amount and cut off values of the productivity distribution 
which defines the type of entrepreneurs. Expressing welfare as a ratio of the “total expected 
wealth” to the amount the entrepreneur could receive by depositing his net worth in a bank: 
 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝔼𝑆𝑡∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
𝜋𝑎
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=−∞
∫  𝑑𝐹 
∞
?̅?𝑡+1











+𝔼𝑆𝑡∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
𝜋𝑎∗
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=𝜋𝑎
∫  𝑑𝐹 
∞
?̅?𝑡+1


















+𝔼𝑆𝑡 ∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
𝜋𝑎∗∗
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=𝜋𝑎∗
[∫  𝑑𝐹 
∞
?̅?𝑡+1

































where the first and the second parts of the equation show the net welfare of the entrepreneurs 
respectively under the h (hedge) and the hs (hedge, speculative) regimes. The latter term shows 
the welfare of entrepreneurs under the hsp (hedge, Speculative and Ponzi) regime. We assume 
Ponzi borrows will default because the benefit of keeping a loan is greater than their collateral 
(earning at time t+1). As shown in Appendix C we rewrite the entrepreneur’s welfare function in 
terms of the leverage term (debt to net worth) 𝜚𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑖 = ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑝 as:  
𝑈𝑡 = 𝔼𝑆𝑡 (∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠) (1 − Γ(?̅?𝑡+1




























                       (41.b) 
  Entrepreneurs maximize this welfare function with respect to the following budget 
constraints. Here the entrepreneurs’ budget constraint is the available resources of the bank 
devoted to loans to entrepreneurs based on the realized state of the nature. Writing this budget 
constraint as a function of bank’s profit:   
 




ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵𝑡+1
ℎ ])













ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵𝑡+1
ℎ ]))) 
+∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
𝜋𝑎∗∗
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=𝜋𝑎∗













𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑠 ]] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1








ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵𝑡+1
ℎ ]






𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑠 ] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵𝑡+1
ℎ ]))













𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑠 ]] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵𝑡+1
ℎ ]))
+ ℕ𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡(𝐵𝑡+1
ℎ + 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑠 + 𝐵𝑡+1











               
𝑗 = ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑝 
where all terms are previously defined and  ℕ𝑡+1 is the net worth of the bank at time t+1. The 
first component is bank profit when the state of nature is bad and all bank resources are devoted 
to hedge borrowers, multiplied by the probability that the bad state of nature occurs. The second 
term is bank profit when the state of nature is normal and bank’s resources are split between 
hedge and speculative borrowers, taking into account the possible speculative borrower default 
on the principal. The third term is bank’s profit when the state of nature is good. Bank’s 
resources are allocated among all borrowers considering the potential default of Ponzi borrowers 
and bank’s cost of monitoring. The last term is the Minsky moment multiplied by the probability 
of occurrence of the Minsky moment. As shown in Appendix C we rewrite this budget constraint 
in terms of the leverage term (debt to net worth ratio) 𝜚𝑡








ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)) 𝜚𝑡
ℎ  




𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑠 , 𝜎𝑡))𝜚𝑡
𝑠










ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)) 𝜚𝑡
ℎ
+ (𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑠 , 𝜎𝑡))𝜚𝑡



















Now we want to solve for the leverage term 𝜚𝑡 and the cut off values of the productivity 
distribution  ?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  and ?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , which can be done by maximizing the welfare function with respect 
to the budget constraint (42.b). This leads to the following first order conditions: 
[𝜚𝑡
ℎ]:   𝔼𝑆𝑡 ∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠) (1 − Γ(?̅?𝑡+1











ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)) −









] − 1))                          (43) 
[𝜚𝑡












𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑠 , 𝜎𝑡)) −
77 
 









] − 1))                            (44) 
[𝜚𝑡





















] − 1)                                                                                                         (45) 
These three F.O.Cs show the optimal leverage for each of the hedge, speculative and Ponzi 
entrepreneurs in terms of the probability functions and the productivity shock distribution, 𝜔. As 
mentioned earlier leverage is defined as the debt net worth ratio, 𝜚𝑡 =
𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡+1







− 1 = 𝜚𝑡 − 1, we can now calculate the optimal loan 𝐵𝑡+1 and net 
worth 𝑁𝑡+1 amounts.   
[?̅?𝑡+1
















𝑄𝑡+1 (−∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
𝜋𝑎∗∗
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=−∞
𝐼?̅?𝑡+1𝑠 (𝜔 ;  𝜎)𝜚𝑡
ℎ  + ∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
𝜋𝑎∗∗
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=𝜋𝑎
(𝐼?̅?𝑡+1𝑠 (𝜔 ;  𝜎) −
𝐺?̅?𝑡+1𝑠 (𝜔 ;  𝜎)) 𝜚𝑡
𝑠 + ∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
𝜋𝑎∗∗
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=𝜋𝑎∗
[(1 − 𝜇)𝐺?̅?𝑡+1𝑠 (𝜔 ;  𝜎)]𝜚𝑡
𝑝 −
𝜆ℳ𝑡+1 (−∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
+∞
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=𝜋𝑎∗∗
[𝐼?̅?𝑡+1𝑠 (𝜔 ;  𝜎) 𝜚𝑡
ℎ + (𝐼?̅?𝑡+1𝑠 (𝜔 ;  𝜎) − 𝐺?̅?𝑡+1𝑠 (𝜔 ;  𝜎)) 𝜚𝑡
𝑠 +










ℎ ]:     ∫ −ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)Γ?̅?𝑡+1ℎ

















ℎ) = 0 
(47) 
First order conditions (46) and (47) show the cut off values in idiosyncratic productivity 
distribution, 𝜔 which divide it up to three intervals (regimes), each for one of the three types of 
hedge, speculative and Ponzi entrepreneurs.  
 The last condition, (48), is associated with the budget constraint. 




ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)) 𝜚𝑡
ℎ  




𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑠 , 𝜎𝑡))𝜚𝑡
𝑠










ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)) 𝜚𝑡
ℎ
+ (𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑠 , 𝜎𝑡))𝜚𝑡

















           (48) 
These six first order conditions (43), (44), (45), (46), (47) and (48) are the policy functions for 
entrepreneurs on the demand side of the market for loanable funds. The first three show the 
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optimal leverage for each of the hedge, speculative and Ponzi entrepreneurs in terms of the 
probability functions and the productivity shock distribution, 𝜔. The next two equations, (46) 
and (47), show the cut off values in idiosyncratic productivity distribution, 𝜔 which divide the 
productivity shock distribution to three intervals (regimes), each for one of the three types of 
hedge, speculative and Ponzi entrepreneurs. Finally, the last equation, (48) represents the budget 
constraint. 
Bank’s Maximization Problem 
Now let us consider the supply of bank loans, or loanable funds to entrepreneurs.  If the 
state of nature is endogenously related to business cycle components, the profit maximization 
problem consists of five parts. The bank’s profit function is equal to the bank’s earnings from 
each type of entrepreneur less the bank’s liabilities to depositors. The first component in bank’s 
profit function is the bank’s profit when the state of nature is bad and all bank resources are 
devoted to hedge borrowers, multiplied by the probability that the bad state of nature occurs. The 
second term is bank’s profit when the state of nature is normal and bank’s resources splits up 
between hedge and speculative borrowers, taking into account the possible speculative borrower 
default on the principal. The third term is bank’s profit when the state of nature is good. Bank’s 
resources are allocated among all borrowers considering the potential default of Ponzi borrowers 
and bank’s cost of monitoring. The fourth term is the losses of the bank at the Minsky moment 
multiplied by the probability of the Minsky moment occurrence. The very last term is the bank’s 
liabilities to depositors. So, the profit maximization problem for the bank is:  
𝑀𝑎𝑥∑𝔼𝑆𝑡𝛽

















𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 𝐵′𝑡+1
𝑠 ]
+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1






+∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
𝜋𝑎∗∗
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=𝜋𝑎∗













𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 𝐵′𝑡+1
𝑠 ]] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1








ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵′𝑡+1
ℎ ]






𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 𝐵′𝑡+1
𝑠 ] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵′𝑡+1
ℎ ]))













𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑠 ]] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵′𝑡+1
ℎ ]))
− (1 + 𝑅𝑡)𝐷𝑡+1 
  





𝑃 = 𝐷𝑡+1 + (1 + 𝑅𝑡)ℕ𝑡                                                                                                 
(50) 
where all terms are as previously defined,  𝐵′𝑡+1
𝑖   is the amount of bank loans to each type of 
entrepreneur i and  ℕ𝑡  is the bank’s net worth at time t .  
ℕ𝑡 the bank’s net worth is equal to the bank’s earnings from each type of entrepreneur 
less the bank’s liabilities to depositors: 


























+∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡 , 𝜎𝑠)
𝜋𝑎∗∗
𝜋𝑠𝑡=𝜋𝑎∗





















































𝑠]] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡
ℎ;  𝜎𝑡−1)][(𝑍𝑡
ℎ + 1)𝐵′𝑡
ℎ]))} − (1 + 𝑅𝑡−1)𝐷𝑡    
                                            (51) 
 
Again, all terms are previously defined and 𝜆ℳ𝑡  is again the “Minsky system risk” shock and 𝐷𝑡 
is available deposit in the bank. Each part of this long expression is related to one of the states in 
Figure 2 which is multiplied by the corresponding probability of that state. The first term is the 
bank’s profit when the state of nature is bad and all bank resources are devoted to hedge 
borrowers. The second term is the bank’s profit when bank resources are split between hedge and 
speculative borrowers, allowing for speculative borrowers potential default on the principal. The 
third term is bank’s profit when bank resources are devoted to all borrowers, and allowing for the 
default of Ponzi borrowers and the bank’s cost of monitoring. The fourth term accounts for the 
Minsky moment. There is also a law of motion for the probability of the state of nature. The last 
term in the constraint shows that bank resources for loans are equal to the amount of deposits of 
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the current period plus the present value of bank’s previous period profit. It is obvious that the 
better the states of nature, the more accumulated profit for the bank, the more Ponzi loans, and as 
it is shown in the next section the greater the probability of a Minsky moment. 
  We solve the bank’s profit maximization problem to find the optimal loan amount offered 
by the bank to each type of entrepreneur as well as the optimal deposit for the bank. To find the 
first order conditions for 𝐵𝑡+1
ℎ ,  𝐵𝑡+1
𝑠  , 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑝
 and 𝐷𝑡+1 , we construct the Lagrangian for the bank’s 
expected profit function:  
  
ℒ = 𝔼𝑆𝑡𝛽

















𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 𝐵′𝑡+1
𝑠 ]
+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵′𝑡+1
ℎ ]))) 
+∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
𝜋𝑎∗∗
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=𝜋𝑎∗













𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 𝐵′𝑡+1
𝑠 ]] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵′𝑡+1
ℎ ])]
− 𝜆ℳ𝑡+1  
 




ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵′𝑡+1
ℎ ]






𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 𝐵′𝑡+1
𝑠 ] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵′𝑡+1
ℎ ]))













𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 𝐵′𝑡+1
𝑠 ]]
+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1











where all terms are previously defined and 𝜆𝑡+1 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the 
budget constraint.  
The first order conditions with respect to 𝐵′𝑡+1
ℎ , 𝐵′𝑡+1
𝑠  , 𝐵′𝑡+1
𝑝








ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)](𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ




ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)](𝑍𝑡+1














𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 ) 









𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)𝑍𝑡+1




𝑝 = 𝔼𝑡(𝛽 + 𝜆𝑡+2(1 + 𝑅𝑡+1)) ∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
𝜋𝑎∗∗
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=𝜋𝑎∗






𝜆ℳ𝑡+1 ∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
+∞
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=𝜋𝑎∗∗





𝑘 ] = 𝜆𝑡+1  (55) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝐷𝑡+1










From these (53), (54) and (55) we can solve for the optimal amount of loans that banks should 
devote to each of hedge, speculative and Ponzi entrepreneurs. Equation (56) shows the optimal 
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deposit for the bank. These four first order conditions with the law of motion for the probability 
of the state of nature (40) and the budget constraints for banks (50) provide five equations 
relating five variables 𝐵′ℎ, 𝐵′𝑠 , 𝐵′𝑝, 𝐷 and 𝜆 . These equations are added to the baseline DSGE 
model of CTW (2011).  
 So far we solved the welfare maximization problem for the entrepreneurs, and the profit 
maximization problem for the banks, but still there are some unknown values in the probability 
function which should be determined before closing both maximization problems. Calculation of 
the threshold levels 𝜋𝑎 , 𝜋𝑎∗  and 𝜋𝑎∗∗  is the last step.
33 These three threshold levels determine 
four different regimes as depicted in Figure 2. The bank’s lending behavior remains the same 
within each regime but changes as the threshold is crossed. However, there is one more 
component in the bank’s profit function that does changes within regimes. That component is the 
probability of the states of nature which changes from one period to the next. 
There is a probability point, in which the bank is indifferent between the regime 1 (i.e., to 
devote all its resources to hedge borrowers) and the regime 2 (to devote resources to both hedge 
and Ponzi borrowers). For 𝜋𝑎 we compare the bank’s profit when banks only give loans to hedge 
borrowers with the next case when banks give loans to both hedge and speculative borrowers.  
([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)(𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)])






𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 (𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)]
+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)(𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡𝐾𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)]) 
                                                          
33 Compared to the discrete case, here we deal with regimes (intervals) rather than a single probability 
value and 𝜋𝑎 , 𝜋𝑎∗ and 𝜋𝑎∗∗ are threshold points. Within these regimes (intervals) bank’s lending behavior 
remains the same but the probability of the state of nature changes from one period to the next. Of course 




 The point at which these two profits are equal is the threshold level 𝜋𝑎which is the ratio of these 




ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1






𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 (𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 −𝑁𝑡+1)] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)(𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)]))
 
For 𝜋𝑎∗  we compare the bank’s profit for the second regime with that of regime 3. Bank’s profit 
when banks give loans to both hedge and speculative borrowers compared to the regime in which 







𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 (𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)]
+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)(𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)])












𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 (𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)]]
+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)(𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)])] 
Again, equalizing two profits, we can solve for  𝜋𝑎∗  the ratio of these two profits and is the point 








𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 (𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)(𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)]))










𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 (𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)]] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)(𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)])]
 
Finally, for 𝜋𝑎∗∗  we compare the bank’s profit in the case 3 regime with that after the 
Minsky moment. Again, there is a probability point, in which the bank’s profit before the Minsky 
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moment is equal to the bank’s losses after the Minsky moment which is represented in regime 4. 
Calling this probability as 𝜋𝑎∗∗  we have: 












𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 (𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)]]
+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)(𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)])]
= 𝜋𝑎∗∗([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)(𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)]






𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 (𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 −𝑁𝑡+1)]
+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)(𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)]))












𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 (𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)]]
+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)(𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡?̅?𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)])) 
There is a break-even point at which the bank’s gains before the Minsky moment are equal to the 
bank’s losses after the Minsky moment. The probability of this point is  𝜋𝑎∗∗  which is the ratio of 
the bank’s profit in regime 3 (before the Minsky moment) and the bank’s losses in regime 4 
(after the Minsky moment). In particular, we are interested to know this probability which is the 
determinant of the Minsky moment.  
𝜋𝑎∗∗
=











𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 (𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡𝐾𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)]] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)(𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡𝐾𝑡+1 −𝑁𝑡+1)])]
([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1





𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 (𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡𝐾𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1











𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 (𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡𝐾𝑡+1 − 𝑁𝑡+1)]] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1




These three values 𝜋𝑎 , 𝜋𝑎∗ and 𝜋𝑎∗∗ are threshold levels between four different regimes. So with 
the probability distribution of ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡 , 𝜎𝑠) in hand one can calculate the probability of occurrence 
of a Minsky moment by substituting the threshold 𝜋𝑎∗∗ into the ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡 , 𝜎𝑠) in each period. This 
could be done simply via the calibration procedure. Since ℎ(. )  is the function of ?̅?𝑠𝑡  which is the 
mean of the probability distribution, and ?̅?𝑠𝑡 changes in each period endogenously. So, during the 
calibration procedure the each period value of ?̅?𝑠𝑡  is known and consequently the ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡 , 𝜎𝑠) is 
known as well. Then by a simple substitution we may calculate the probability of occurrence of a 
Minsky moment in each period. 
Aggregation 
Market for loanable funds clears when the supply of loans is equal to demand. This 
means 𝐵′𝑡+1
𝑖 = 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑖  for 𝑖 = ℎ, 𝑠, 𝑝 and consequently ∑𝐵′𝑡+1
𝑖 = ∑𝐵𝑡+1
𝑖 . To connect the Minsky 
financial friction to the rest of the model in CTW (2011) we need to aggregate net worth and 





𝑇 lead to 




















The same as for the net worth, for ?̅?𝑡 , which is the amount of physical capital that entrepreneurs 
acquired in period 𝑡 − 1, market clearing condition requires: 
 ?̅?𝑡 = ∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)𝐾𝑡
ℎ𝜋𝑎∗∗
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=−∞
+ ∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)𝐾𝑡
𝑠𝜋𝑎∗∗
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1= 𝜋𝑎













          (58) 
where all terms are previously defined.  
Each entrepreneur faces an identical and independent probability of 1 − 𝛾𝑡 of exiting the 
economy and the complementary probability of 𝛾𝑡 of remaining in the economy. Because of the 
random selection, the net worth of the entrepreneur who remains is 𝛾𝑡?̅?𝑡. To ensure that these 
survivors and new arrivals who remain in the economy, have sufficient funds to obtain at least 
some amount of loans, we assume they receive a transfer 𝑊𝑡
𝑒 from households, which is the 
wealth transfer. This is due to the fact that some entrepreneurs leave the market. So ?̅?𝑡+1 has 
another component which is 1 − 𝛾𝑡 .  To accommodate this we assume that remaining 
entrepreneurs receive an equivalent wealth transfer, otherwise the market does not clear. So the 
average net worth of all entrepreneurs after receiving 𝑊𝑡
𝑒 is ?̅?𝑡+1 = 𝛾𝑡?̅?𝑡 +𝑊𝑡
𝑒 . 
Now we have the solutions for both the entrepreneur’s welfare maximization problem 
and the bank’s profit maximization problem, which we can add to the CTW (2011) model. We 
aggregated the model and also calculated three thresholds for four different state of nature 
regimes.  
Conclusion 
The global financial crisis made clear that the financial sector and financial frictions play 
an integral role in the macroeconomy. So this paper introduces a new mechanism for financial 
frictions in a monetary DSGE model following Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis (1977). 
Minsky’s FIH says that over periods of prolonged prosperity and optimism about future 
economic prospects, banks (lenders) devote more resources to riskier borrowers (Ponzi), which 
can make the economic system more vulnerable to collapse in the case of default. We use this 
mechanism to introduce a new type of financial (banking) friction. Here we consider two 
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different scenarios. The first is when the states of nature are exogenous and banks do not 
accumulate profit over time. We consider four states of nature: good, normal, bad and Minsky. 
We use a Bayesian updater mechanism to calculate the corresponding probability for each state. 
We expand the Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2011) model by introducing three different 
types of entrepreneurs or borrowers: hedge, speculative and Ponzi borrowers. Then we also 
change the role of banks from a non-risk taking financial intermediary in the CTW (2011) model 
to a risky one. We maximize the entrepreneur’s welfare function with respect to the bank’s zero 
profit function (which is the budget constraint for the entrepreneur’s maximization problem) and 
calculate the optimal leverage and the cut off values in the productivity distribution 𝜔 for each 
entrepreneur.  
The second scenario is when the states of nature are endogenously determined, and banks 
accumulate profit over time. We link the accumulation of debt to the endogenous state of nature, 
which is absent in the current DSGE literature. The state of nature is a function of past history 
and the relative state of the business cycle. So ultimately the bank’s profit function is a function 
of business cycle fluctuations. In fact, a major contribution is the introduction of the banking 
crises endogenously to DSGE literature. Under the endogenous states of nature, we deal with 
infinite states of nature within four regimes (intervals). There are three threshold levels, 𝜋𝑎 , 𝜋𝑎∗  
and 𝜋𝑎∗∗. Within these regimes bank’s lending behavior remains the same, but the probability of 
the state of nature changes from one period to the next. That is because the mean of the 
probability distribution which is a function of past history and the current state of the business 
cycle changes in each period endogenously. In fact, the current state of nature, where the 
economy is now in the business cycle, is a function of the previous state of nature and the current 
growth rate of per capita income. If the state of nature crosses a threshold, agents’ behavior 
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changes. We solve the general equilibrium model for both entrepreneurs and banks separately 
and associate their maximization problems to the realized state of nature and the relative state of 
the business cycle. We also introduce a new type of shock, which we call the “Minsky system 
risk” shock. This shock captures the intermediation among banks in the banking system which 
generates excessive system risk. We solve the entrepreneurs’ maximization problem for the 
optimal leverage and the cut off values in the productivity distribution 𝜔 and the bank’s 
maximization problem for the optimal loan and deposit amounts. We end up with first order 
conditions and Euler equations on both of demand and supply sides of the market for loanable 
funds which determine the optimal leverage, cut off values in the productivity distribution, loan 
and deposit amounts. These equations could be replaced with the current financial friction 
equations in CTW (2011). We also calculate the likelihood of a Minsky moment endogenously 
as a function of the leverage term and the cut off values in the productivity distribution based on 
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Appendix A: Model 
A.1 Households 
    We begin with the representative household, which maximizes the expected discounted flow 
of utility, subject to the period utility function and an inter-temporal budget constraint: 
𝐸0∑𝛽




where 𝑁𝑡 is hours of labor,  𝐶𝑡 is a composite consumption index, ℵ𝑡 is a potential 








                                  (2𝐴) 
 
Where, 𝜎 is the elasticity of demand for the composite consumption good with respect to real 
prices and 𝜑 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. 









𝑑𝑗 𝑑𝑖 + 𝐸𝑡{𝑄𝑡,𝑡+1𝐷𝑡+1} ≤ 𝐷𝑡 +𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑡 + 𝑇𝑡 
for  𝑡 = 0,1,2, …                                                                                                (3A) 
Where 𝐶𝐻,𝑡 is an index of quantities of domestic goods, 𝐶𝑖,𝑡  is an index of the quantity  of goods 
imported from country i,  𝑃𝐻,𝑡(𝑗) is the price of domestic consumption good variety j. 𝑃𝑖,𝑡(𝑗) is 
the price of variety j imported from country i. 𝐷𝑡+1 is the nominal payoff in period 𝑡 + 1 of the 
household’s investment portfolio (savings) held at the end of period 𝑡 (which includes shares in 
                                                          
34  For more details on preference shock and its functional form see Fernandez-Villaverde (2010).  
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firms), 𝑊𝑡 is the nominal wage, 𝑇𝑡 is lump sum taxes/transfers
35 and all are expressed in units of 
domestic currency. 𝑄𝑡,𝑡+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one-period ahead (t+1) nominal 
payoffs relevant to the domestic household. And we assume that households’ have access to a 
complete set of contingent claims, traded internationally. The intra-temporal optimality condition 







                                                             (4𝐴) 
Note that for the optimizing household in the small open economy the following inter-temporal 








                                    (5𝐴) 
where 𝑉𝑡,𝑡+1 is the period t price (in domestic currency) of an Arrow security, 𝜉𝑡,𝑡+1 is the 
probability of that state of nature being realized in 𝑡 + 1 (conditional on the state of nature at t ).  
    Given that the price of the Arrow security and the one-period stochastic discount factor are 

















) = 𝑄𝑡,𝑡+1                                         (6𝐴) 
which is assumed to be satisfied for all possible states of nature at t and 𝑡 + 1. Equations (4A) 
and (6A) can now be written in log-linear form as: 
                                                          
35 Note that this is a good assumption if monetary policy is active and fiscal policy is passive (See Leeper, 
1991. This is exactly the case for Mexico’s economy, as Seoane (2011) shows, after 2002, Mexico’s 
monetary policy is active and fiscal policy is passive.  
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𝑤𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 = 𝜎 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜑 𝑛𝑡 
 
𝑐𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡{𝑐𝑡+1} −
1
𝜎
(𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡{𝜋𝑡+1} − 𝜌 + 𝐸𝑡{Δð𝑡+1})                         (7𝐴) 
where lowercase letters denote logs of the respective variables, and 𝑖𝑡 ≡ − log𝑄𝑡 is the short 
term nominal interest rate,  𝜌 ≡ − log 𝛽 is the time discount rate, ð𝑡 = logℵ𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡−1 
is CPI inflation (with 𝑝𝑡 ≡ log 𝑃𝑡). 





which can be approximated (up to first order) around a symmetric steady state  by  
𝑠𝑡 ≡ log 𝑆𝑡 = 𝑝𝐹,𝑡 − 𝑝𝐻,𝑡                                         (8𝐴) 
    Similarly, log-linearization of the CPI around the same symmetric steady state yields  
𝑝𝑡 ≡ (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝐻,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑝𝐹,𝑡 
= 𝑝𝐻,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑠𝑡                                      (9𝐴) 
where 𝛼  represents a natural index of openness. 
    We distinguish between domestic inflation (home goods) and the CPI (all goods).  Then 
domestic inflation, defined as the rate of change in the index of domestic goods prices, i.e., 
𝜋𝐻,𝑡 ≡ 𝑝𝐻,𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝐻,𝑡, and CPI inflation are linked since 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋𝐻,𝑡 + 𝛼∆𝑠𝑡                                           (10𝐴) 
    If the law of one price for individual goods holds at all times (both for import and export 
prices), then 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = ℰ𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑖 , where ℰ𝑖,𝑡 is the bilateral nominal exchange rate (the price of country 
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i’s currency in terms of domestic currency) and 𝑃𝑖 𝑡
𝑖  is the price of country i’s goods expressed in 
terms of its own currency. By log linearization around the symmetric steady state 
𝑝𝐹,𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 + 𝑝 𝑡
∗                                                                                             (11𝐴) 
where 𝑒𝑡 ≡ ∫ 𝑒𝑖,𝑡𝑑𝑖 
1
0
 is the log of the effective nominal exchange rate and, 𝑝𝑡




 is the 
log of the world price index.  
    Combining (11A) with the definition of the terms of trade yields the expression for the log of 
the effective terms of trade: 
𝑠𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 + 𝑝
∗ − 𝑝𝐻,𝑡                                              (12𝐴) 
    In addition we can derive a relationship between the terms of trade and the real exchange rate. 






    Let 𝑞𝑡 ≡ ∫ 𝑞𝑖,𝑡𝑑𝑖 
1
0
be the log effective real exchange rate where, 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = log𝒬𝑖,𝑡. Then it follows 
that: 
𝑞𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑠𝑡                                                      (13𝐴) 
    Combining the first order conditions of the small open economy with the analogous first order 
conditions of country i and the definition of the real exchange rate we get: 







𝜎                                                   (14𝐴) 
where 𝜗𝑖  is a constant and depends on the initial conditions regarding relative net asset positions. 
So if ℵ𝑡
𝑖 = ℵ𝑡 we can write  (14A) as: 
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 is the index for world consumption in log terms, , ð𝑡
∗ is the world preference 
shock and 𝔖𝑡 = ð𝑡
∗ − ð𝑡. If  ℵ𝑡
∗ = ℵ𝑡, so 𝔖𝑡 = 0. Thus, the assumption of complete markets at 
the international level links domestic consumption with world consumption and the terms of 
trade. This equation along with equation 10 guarantees uncovered interest parity (UIP) holds.      
 From the household side, equations 7A-13A and 15A are the final equations in the model 
to be simulated.  
A.2 Firms 
    A typical firm in the home economy produces a differentiated good with linear technology 
represented by: 
𝑌𝑡(𝑗) =  𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡(𝑗) 
where 𝑎𝑡 ≡ log𝐴𝑡 follows the AR(1) process 𝑎𝑡 = 𝜌𝑎𝑎𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑎𝑡, 𝑎𝑡
∗)𝜀𝑡
∗, where 𝑗 ∈ [0,1] is 
a firm specific index and 𝜀𝑡 is a zero mean white noise process. Constant returns to scale are 
assumed for purposes of exposition.  
Hence, the real marginal costs, MC, (expressed in terms of domestic firms’ domestic prices) are 
common across domestic firms may be written as: 
𝑚𝑐𝑡 = −𝑣 + 𝑤𝑡 − 𝑝𝐻,𝑡 − 𝑎𝑡 
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where 𝑣 ≡ log(1 − 𝜏), with 𝜏 being an employment subsidy. It is also assumed that firms follow 
Calvo (1983) staggered price setting. I.e., (1 − 𝜃), 0 < 𝜃 < 1, of (randomly selected) firms set 
new prices in each period, with an individual firm’s probability of re-optimizing in any given 
period being independent of the time elapsed since its last reset price. The optimal price-setting 
strategy for the typical firm resetting its price in period t can be approximated by the (log-linear) 
rule 
?̅?𝐻,𝑡 = 𝜇 + (1 − 𝛽𝜃)∑(𝛽𝜃)




where ?̅?𝐻,𝑡 denotes the log of newly set domestic prices, and 𝜇 ≡ log
ℶ
ℶ−1
 is the log of the (gross) 
mark up in the steady state (or, equivalently, the equilibrium mark up in the flexible price 
economy). ℶ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between varieties produced within a given 
country.  
    On the supply side, the relationship between the aggregate production function and aggregate 
employment is: 


























 around the perfect foresight steady state 
are of second order. Thus up to a first order approximation, the following relationship will hold  
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑛𝑡                                                                (17𝐴) 
 
    The log-linearized optimal price-setting condition (17A) can be combined with the (log-
linearized) difference equation describing the evolution of domestic prices (as a function of 
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newly set prices) to yield an equation determining domestic inflation as a function of deviations 
of marginal cost from its steady state value36: 




. Real marginal cost can also be determined as a function of domestic 
output: 
 𝑚𝑐𝑡 = −𝑣 + 𝜎𝑦𝑡
∗ + 𝜑𝑦𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡 − (1 + 𝜑)𝑎𝑡 + ð𝑡
∗ − ð𝑡                   (19𝐴) 
    Finally, note that under flexible prices, 𝑚𝑐𝑡 = −𝜇 where 𝜇 is the optimal mark up. Thus, the 
natural level of output in the open economy is given by 
𝑦𝑡
𝑛 = Γ0 + Γ𝑎. a𝑡 + Γ∗𝑦𝑡
∗ + Γð∗ð𝑡
∗ + Γð ð𝑡 + Γð𝑖ð𝑡








> 0,  Γ∗ ≡ −
𝛼Θ 𝜎𝛼
𝜎𝛼+𝜑















   and Θ ≡ (σγ − 1) + (1 − α)(ση − 1) = ω − 1. 
 From the production sector equations 17A, 19A and 20A are those in the model to be 
simulated.  
A.3 Market Clearing and Equilibrium 






















]            (21A) 
   The first-order log-linear approximation around the symmetric steady state is 







𝑖 − ð𝑡) 
                                                          
36 Note that price distortions are temporary and this real marginal cost mechanism determines short-run 
fluctuations of inflation around a monetary policy induced trend. The dynamic relationship between real 










𝑖 − ð𝑡)                                              (22𝐴) 
where 𝜔 ≡ 𝜎𝛾 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝜎𝜂 − 1) and by aggregating over all countries the world market 
clearing condition is: 
𝑦𝑡










∗                                      (23𝐴) 
where 𝑦𝑡
∗, 𝑐𝑡









∗ − ð𝑡) − 𝛼(ð𝑡





    Finally, combining (22A) with the Euler equation (7A) gives 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡{𝑦𝑡+1} −
1
𝜎












                                    𝑦𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡{𝑦𝑡+1} −
1
𝜎𝛼




[(1 − 𝛼)𝐸𝑡{Δð𝑡+1} + 𝛼𝐸𝑡{∆ð𝑡+1
𝑖 } − 𝐸𝑡{∆ð𝑡+1
∗ }]           (25𝐴) 
Where again Θ ≡ (σγ − 1) + (1 − α)(ση − 1) = ω − 1. 
 
A.4 The Trade Balance 






 . 𝐶𝑡) denote net exports in terms of domestic output, expressed as a 
fraction of the steady state output Y. A first order approximation yields 𝑛𝑥𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 − 𝛼𝑠𝑡 
which combined with (22A) implies 
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𝑛𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼 (
𝜔
𝜎









Appendix B: List of final equations in the model 
𝜋𝐻,𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡{𝜋𝐻,𝑡+1} + 𝑘𝛼?̃?𝑡 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡{?̃?𝑡+1} −
1
𝜎𝛼
(𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡{𝜋𝐻,𝑡+1} − 𝑟𝑡
𝑛) 
𝑟𝑡









+ 𝜎𝛼 ( Γð −
𝛼Θ(1 − α) 
𝜎





















𝔜𝑡 = 𝜌𝑣𝔜𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝔜
 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌 + 𝜙𝜋𝜋𝐻,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑦?̃?𝑡 + 𝔜𝑡 
𝑛𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼 (
𝜔
𝜎




𝑖 − ð𝑡) 
?̃?𝑡 ≡ 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡
𝑛 
𝑦𝑡
𝑛 = Γ0 + Γ𝑎. a𝑡 + Γ∗𝑦𝑡
∗ + Γð∗ð𝑡










∗ − ð𝑡) − 𝛼(ð𝑡
𝑖 − ð𝑡)] 







𝑖 − ð𝑡) 









𝑞𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑠𝑡 
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𝑠𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 + 𝑝
∗ − 𝑝𝐻,𝑡 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋𝐻,𝑡 + 𝛼∆𝑠𝑡 
𝜋𝐻,𝑡 ≡ 𝑝𝐻,𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝐻,𝑡 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡−1 
𝑚𝑐𝑡 = −𝑣 + 𝜎𝑦𝑡
∗ + 𝜑𝑦𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡 − (1 + 𝜑)𝑎𝑡 + (ð𝑡
∗ − ð𝑡) 
𝑤𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 = 𝜎𝑐𝑡 + 𝜑𝑛𝑡 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡











Appendix C: List of parameters 
𝛽 = Household’s discount factor  
𝜂 = Measures the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods from view 
point of domestic consumer 
ℶ =   Elasticity of substitution between varieties produced within any given 
economy 
𝛾 = Measures the substitutability between goods produced in different foreign 
countries 
𝛼 = Measure of openness = a natural index of openness 
𝜎 =Elasticity demand of consumers w.r.t. real prices  
𝜑= A Frisch elasticity of labor supply w.r.t. real wage 
𝜉𝑡 = Probability of state of nature  
𝜌 = Household’s discount rate → 𝜌 ≡  − log 𝛽 
𝜗𝑖 = A constant that will generally depend on initial conditions regarding relative 
net asset position 
𝜌𝑎 = Coefficient of lagged value of technology in technology shock equation  
𝜌𝔜 = Coefficient of lagged value of interest rate in monetary policy shock equation 
𝜀𝑎 = Random error in AR(1) technology change (growth) equation.(Technology 
shock equation)  
𝜀𝔜 =   Random error in AR(1) interest rate equation (Monetary policy shock)  
𝜙𝑦 = Non-negative coefficient of ?̃?𝑡, chosen by the monetary authority 
𝜙𝜋 =Non-negative coefficient of 𝜋𝑡, chosen by the monetary authority 
𝑣 ≡ log(1 − 𝜏) 
𝜏 = An employment subsidy 
𝜇 = logℳ →ℳ =
𝜀
𝜀−1
= Desired markup→ 𝜇 ≡ log
𝜀
𝜀−1
 so 𝜇 is the log of the 
(gross) mark up.  
𝜃 = Probability of firm not resetting price = natural index of price stickiness   




> 0  





























> 0  




Appendix D: List of variables 
𝐶𝑡 = Consumption index 
𝑁𝑡 =Hours of labor 
𝐶𝐻,𝑡 = Index of consumption of domestic goods 
𝐶𝐹,𝑡 = Index of imported goods 
𝑃𝐻,𝑡(𝑗) = Price of domestic variety j 
𝑃𝐹,𝑡 = Price index for imported goods 
𝐷𝑡+1 =  Nominal payoff in period 𝑡 + 1 of the portfolio held at the end of period 𝑡 
𝑊𝑡 = Nominal wage 
𝑇𝑡 = Lump sum taxes/transfers  
𝑄𝑡,𝑡+1 = Stochastic discount factor for one-period ahead (t+1) nominal payoffs relevant to 
the domestic household 
𝑉𝑡,𝑡+1 =  The period t price (in domestic currency) of an Arrow security 
𝜉𝑡,𝑡+1 = Probability of that state of nature being realized in 𝑡 + 1 
𝑖𝑡 ≡ − log𝑄𝑡 is the short term nominal rate 




= Bilateral terms of trade between the domestic economy and economy i 
ℰ𝑖,𝑡 = Bilateral nominal exchange rate 
𝑒𝑡 = Log of the effective nominal exchange rate 
𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = log 𝒬𝑖,𝑡 = Log effective real exchange rate 
𝑐𝑡
∗ = Index for U.S. (world) consumption in log terms 
𝑦𝑡
∗ = Index for U.S. (world) output in log terms 
𝑎𝑡 ≡ log 𝐴𝑡 = Log technology shock in Mexico 
𝑎𝑡
∗ = Log technology shock in U.S 
𝑛𝑥𝑡 = Net exports 
?̃?𝑡 = Output gap 
𝑦𝑡
𝑛 = Natural output 
𝑟𝑡
𝑛 = Natural rate of interest 
𝔜𝑡 = Exogenous component of monetary policy shock 
ℵ𝑡 =  a potential preference shock 
ð𝑡 = logℵ𝑡  
 
Appendix E:  Data Sources 
- U.S. Department of labor 
- OECD countries database 
- Bank de Mexico 
- World Bank tables (WDI, 2013) 
- ILO database 
- Penn World Tables (version 7.1) 
- International Financial Statistics Tables (IFS, 2013) 








Table F.1: Floating rate buffer effect for productivity shock 
 B. Floating Rate IRFs (Mexico)  





















































































C. Fixed Rate IRFs (Mexico) 























































































D. Difference in IRFs, i.e. Buffer from Float 
















































































































Table F.2: Floating rate buffer effect for preference shock 
 A. Floating Rate IRFs (Mexico)  





















































































B. Fixed Rate IRFs (Mexico) 























































































C. Difference in IRFs, i.e. Buffer from Float 


























































































































Parameters Best Moment Estimation 
sigma_us 0.6 Beta(0.9955) 
rho_a_star 0.7 0.7 
phi_us 3 Norm(1.099) 
rho_us 0.0101 0.0101 
nu_star 0.2 0.2 
muu_us 1.2 1.2 
beta_us 0.99 0.99 
theta_us 0.75 0.75 
phi_pi_star 1.5 1.5 
phi_y_star 0.5/4 0.5/4 
nu_mex 0.2 0.2 
sigma_mex 0.2 Beta(0.9927) 
phi_mex 0.5 Norm(4.5758) 
alpha_mex 0.5 0.1 
eta_mex 1 Norm(0.9238) 
gamma_mex 2.5 Beta(0.5557) 
a_shock_correl 0.2 0.2 
rho_a 0.19 0.19 
muu_mex 1.2 1.2 
rho_mex 0.0513 0.0513 
beta_mex 0.95 0.95 
phi_pi 1.5 1.5 
phi_y 0.5/4 0.5/4 
theta_mex 0.75 0.75 
rho_v 0.65 0.5 
rho_J 0.7 0.7 
rho_v_star 0.41 0.4 
rho_J_star 0.7 0.7 







Appendix J: Business Cycle Characteristics and Welfare Losses 
Business cycle characteristics are displayed in Table J.1, which reports the standard deviations of 
key variables in alternative models: floating, fixed, domestic inflation-based Taylor rule (DITR), 
CPI inflation-based Taylor rule (CITR)37. We observe that under the float volatility of Mexican 
GDP is the lowest and under the peg it is the highest. For the inflation rate it is exactly opposite. 
Under the fixed exchange rate the Mexican inflation rate volatility is lowest. Floating amplifies 
the volatility and under DITR it is the highest.     
Table J.1: Cyclical properties (Moments) of Alternative Regimes 
Variables Actual  Float Fixed CITR DITR 
Std % Std% %Std %Std %Std %Std 
U.S. GDP 1.5 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
U.S. Consumption 1.2 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
U.S. Interest Rate 0.38 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
U.S. Inflation Rate 0.6 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
Mexico GDP 2.3 2.31 3.76 3.21 2.95 
Mexico Consumption 2.7 2.70 3.68 3.70 3.55 
Mexico Interest Rate 0.26 0.26 0.21 0.83 0.27 
Mexico Inflation Rate 0.62 0.53 0.60 0.92 0.70 
 
  
                                                          
37 Under both inflation targeting regimes (DITR and CITR) the exchange rate is floating.  Under the pure 
float the interest rate rule followed by the central bank is  𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌 + 𝜙𝜋𝜋𝐻,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑦?̃?𝑡 + 𝔜𝑡 that is the 
optimal rule. Under DITR the central bank rule is   𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌 + 𝜙𝜋𝜋𝐻,𝑡 + 𝔜𝑡 i. Under CITR it is  𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌 +




Table J.2 reports the welfare losses of alternatives to the floating exchange rate regime in 
percentage units of steady state consumption. Obviously the fixed exchange rate regime 
amplifies the volatility of both domestic inflation and output gap. But the welfare losses are the 
most for the CPIT. Thus, the first best, after floating exchange rate, is the fixed exchange rate 
regime and the next best is DIT.  













0.3465 0.6053 1.1136 0.5210 
Var(Outout 
gap) 
5.6140 9.8047 10.5702 11.4063 
Total 5.9605 10.4100 11.6838 11.9273 
















𝑛)𝑡−𝑟. Pr(𝜃𝑛 = 𝜃1
𝑛) + (𝜃2
𝑛)𝑟(1 − 𝜃2










𝑛)𝑡−𝑟. Pr(𝜃𝑛 = 𝜃1
𝑛) + (𝜃2
𝑛)𝑟(1 − 𝜃2




           (1A) 









𝑚)𝑡−𝑟. Pr(𝜃𝑚 = 𝜃1
𝑚) + (𝜃2
𝑚)𝑟(1 − 𝜃2










𝑚)𝑡−𝑟. Pr(𝜃𝑚 = 𝜃1
𝑚) + (𝜃2
𝑚)𝑟(1 − 𝜃2





                                                                                                             (2A) 
and as mentioned earlier for the bad state of nature: 
𝜋𝑠𝑡





                                                                                                                                               (3A) 






Using (7) and (8), and also for the sake of simplification by substituting the equation (17) in the bank zero 
profit condition, and rewrite as a new budget constraint which is no longer a function of 𝐵𝑡 and 𝑍𝑡 but a 
function of the leverage term. Now the bank zero profit condition (budget constraint) is: 
𝜋𝑠𝑡
𝑏 ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡)][?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ 𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 ?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ]) + 𝜋𝑠𝑡









+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1






















+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1



















+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1




















+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡)][?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ 𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑘′,𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 ?̅?𝑡+1






For simplicity and without loss of generality we assume each type of borrower has the same net worth and 








= 𝑁𝑡  
38we 
have 
                                                          
38 We also solve the model with the alternative assumption of ?̅?𝑡
𝑖 and ?̅?𝑡
𝑖 which leads to 𝜚𝑡
𝑖  in the solution. 





𝑏 ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1











𝑘 𝜚𝑡] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1


















+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1





𝑚 [([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡)][?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 𝜚𝑡]







𝑘 𝜚𝑡] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡)][?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑘 𝜚𝑡])













+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡)][?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ 𝑅𝑡+1









Entrepreneur’s Welfare Function 
 
Expressing welfare as a ratio of the expected wealth to the amount the entrepreneur could receive by 
depositing his net worth in a bank: 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝔼𝑆𝑡 ∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
𝜋𝑎
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=−∞
∫  𝑑𝐹 
∞
?̅?𝑡+1












+𝔼𝑆𝑡∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
𝜋𝑎∗
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=𝜋𝑎
∫  𝑑𝐹 
∞
?̅?𝑡+1





















+𝔼𝑆𝑡 ∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
𝜋𝑎∗∗
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=𝜋𝑎∗
[∫  𝑑𝐹 
∞
?̅?𝑡+1












































where the first and the second parts of the equation show the net welfare of the entrepreneurs 
respectively under the h (hedge) and the hs (hedge, speculative) regimes. The latter term shows the 
welfare of entrepreneurs under the hsp (hedge, Speculative and Ponzi) regimes. We assume Ponzi 
borrows will default because the benefit of keeping a loan is greater than their collateral (earning at time 





𝑇  leads to: 
𝑈𝑡 =
𝔼𝑆𝑡 ∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠) ∫  𝑑𝐹 
∞
?̅?𝑡+1





























































𝑇  and rewrite the entrepreneur’s welfare 
function in terms of the leverage variable 𝜚𝑡











































































ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵𝑡+1
ℎ ])













ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵𝑡+1
ℎ ]))) 
+∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
𝜋𝑎∗∗
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=𝜋𝑎∗













𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑠 ]] + ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵𝑡+1
ℎ ])] − 𝜆ℳ𝑡+1 
 












𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑠 ]
+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵𝑡+1
ℎ ]))












𝑠  , 𝜎𝑡)[𝑍𝑡+1
𝑠 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑠 ]]
+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ ;  𝜎𝑡)][(𝑍𝑡+1
ℎ + 1)𝐵𝑡+1
ℎ ])) + ℕ𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡(𝐵𝑡+1
ℎ + 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑠 + 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑃 ) = ℕ𝑡+1 
 (4C) 
where ℕ𝑡+1 is the net worth of the bank at time t+1. It is equal to the bank’s cash flow at this period. 









































+∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠)
𝜋𝑎∗∗
𝜋𝑠𝑡+1=𝜋𝑎∗























+ ([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1



















ℎ + (∫ ?̅?𝑡+1
































































𝑠 , 𝜎𝑡)                                   (6𝐶) 
∫ ?̅?𝑡+1





(𝜔𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑡) + 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑠 , 𝜎𝑡) = 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)                        (7𝐶) 
([1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡)]?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ + 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) = Γ(?̅?𝑡+1
ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡)                        (8𝐶) 
 
we simplify (5C)  




ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)) 𝜚𝑡
ℎ  




𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑠 , 𝜎𝑡)) 𝜚𝑡
𝑠










ℎ  ;  𝜎𝑡) − 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)) 𝜚𝑡
ℎ
+ (𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡) − 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑠 , 𝜎𝑡)) 𝜚𝑡






















using the definitions of expectation: 
1 = ∫ 𝜔 𝑑𝐹 
∞
0




(𝜔 , 𝜎𝑡) + 𝐼(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑆 , 𝜎𝑡)                                                          (10𝐶) 
1 = ∫ 𝜔 𝑑𝐹 
∞
0




(𝜔 , 𝜎𝑡) + 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑠 , 𝜎𝑡)









(𝜔 , 𝜎𝑡) + 𝐺(?̅?𝑡+1
𝑠 , 𝜎𝑡)                          (11𝐶) 
 
 
We can rewrite the entrepreneur’s welfare function (3C) as:  
   
𝔼𝑆𝑡 (∫ ℎ(?̅?𝑠𝑡+1 , 𝜎𝑠) (1 − Γ(?̅?𝑡+1




























Appendix N: Summary of CTW (2011) model 
 
 
As it is shown in figure 1 and figure 2, the model introduces labor market and financial 
market frictions in a small open economy framework. The model consists of households, 
intermediate and final good producers for two different goods (consumption and investment 
goods), exporters and importers, fiscal and monetary Authorities, banks and entrepreneurs, 
capital producers and employment agencies. Households have access to both domestic and 
foreign asset market. And there are homogenous domestic good market, homogenous foreign 
good market, homogenous labor market and homogenous capital market. Here specifically we 





Source: CTW (2011) 
 
 
Source: CTW (2011) 
 
